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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of the twentieth century, the federal courts have
assumed that they must choose between two extreme methods of
analyzing conduct under Section 1 of the Sherman Act:' a per se rule
that deems certain conduct illegal on its face;2 or, a rule of reason that
inquires into all conceivable circumstances before determining the
legality of a particular restraint.3 Until the 1970s, the courts were
* Vice President-Law, Parker-Hannifm Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio. B-., Allegheny
College, 1971; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this Article are
personal to the Author and do not reflect the opinions of Parker-Hannifm Corporation.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
2. See, for example, Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating
that the per se rule avoids a fruitless and costly economic investigation into the history of the
industry involved).
3. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (listing several
factors a court should consider before invoking antitrust sanctions); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977) (citing the statement of the rule of reason in Chicago
Board of Trade). As the Federal Trade Commission has stated:
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enamored of the clarity, simplicity, and deterrent effects of per se
rules.4 As they have become more knowledgeable about economic
theory in the last fifteen years, however, the courts have grown
disillusioned with the absolutism of the per se rule and have been
more inclined to consider efficiency justifications for competitive
restraints. As a result, the courts have narrowed the scope of the per
se rule and expanded applications of the rule of reason.5
Unfortunately, however, the modem rule of reason has no
substantive content. Although the rule of reason has been character-
ized as the "prevailing standard of [Section 1] analysis,"6 it is
curiously lacking in definition. Indeed, the federal courts have had
little experience in applying the standard. Rule of reason trials were
rare from the early part of the century through the 1960s because the
per se rule dominated Section 1 analysis.7 Even in recent years,
plaintiffs have been reluctant to bring a rule of reason case because
its evidentiary hurdles are so difficult to meet. It is particularly
burdensome for a plaintiff to provb that a defendant has sufficient
market power to adversely affect competition in the relevant market.8
As a consequence, the courts have had few opportunities to define the
rule of reason. It remains a vague listing of factors that gives neither
[L]itigants and courts have taken positions that distort both ends of this dichot-
omy-saying that conduct must be condemned automatically, without regard for any re-
deeming competitive virtues, if it can be categorized as falling into a per se category;
while conduct falling into the residual rule of reason category cannot be condemned at
all until all aspects of definition, market power, intent, and net competitive effect have
been analyzed-a process that many consider to be the antitrust equivalent to Chinese
water torture.
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 603 (1988).
4. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
5. The so-called Chicago School, which initially gained influence among academics, see
Betty Bock, An Economist Appraises Vertical Restraints, 30 Antitrust Bull. 117, 120-21 (1985),
advocates greater deference to the business judgment of the parties to a competitive restraint
and is identified with the rule of reason approach. During the last fifteen years many of the
academics who initially advocated the Chicago School laissez-faire antitrust approach were
appointed to the federal bench and began to apply their economic theory in antitrust cases. See,
for example, Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J.) (holding that the antitrust inquiry must focus on whether the effect of the conduct at
issue limits or enhances free market competition); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776
F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.) (stating that the per se rule is only designed for
naked restraints, while the rule of reason is used for agreements that facilitate activity); Valley
Liquors v. Renfield Importers, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (holding that the
plaintiff in a restricted distribution case must show that, after weighing the effects on both
intrabrand and interbrand competition, the restriction is unreasonable).
6. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
7. See notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
8. See notes 48, 62, 63 and accompanying text.
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courts nor litigants a clear understanding of the types of competitive
conduct that will be permitted or precluded. The rule of reason's lack
of guidance is currently "one of the more vexing problems of antitrust
law."
This Article proposes a new standard of analysis for Section 1
conduct that avoids the extremes of both the per se rule and the rule
of reason. The courts can achieve the clarity of per se rules without
precluding defendants from demonstrating efficiency justifications for
their conduct. The key to such an approach lies in classifying Section
1 conduct into categories according to the conduct's likely impact on
competition. The courts have had sufficient experience with most
Section 1 restraints to classify them by their most probable competi-
tive effect. Under the proposed standard, the amount of necessary
judicial analysis would vary according to the category within which
specific conduct falls. In most cases the courts could avoid the
complications of market power analysis entirely. Certain types of
restraints are almost always anticompetitive. Their illegality can be
presumed without unduly prejudicing defendants. On the other hand,
there should be a presumption in favor of the legality of those
restraints that usually promote efficiency. Such presumptions would
simplify antitrust trials and provide better guidance to American
firms on the legality of particular competitive restraints. The use of
presumptions, however, would not require a return to the
arbitrariness of the per se approach. The courts could afford a
rebuttal opportunity to the party against whom a presumption was
directed. The party would have an opportunity to demonstrate that a
particular restraint possessed special competitive characteristics that
distinguished it from the ordinary case. Such an approach would
ensure that the courts' ultimate decisions in Section 1 cases are
grounded upon the substantive economic effect of the conduct at issue.
II. THE TRADITIONAL PER SE STANDARD
The per se rule was dominant throughout the activist antitrust
era of the 1960s. By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court had applied
the per se rule to tying arrangements, 10 horizontal territorial and
9. David A. Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, the Rule of Reason and the General Motors-
Toyota Joint Venture, 30 Wayne L. Rev. 1239, 1249 (1984).
10. Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5-7.
19941 1755
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customer allocations," and group boycotts.12 The per se trend reached
its peak in 19671' when, in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,14
the Court extended the per se rule to nonprice vertical restrictions
imposed by a supplier on its distributors. 15
The activist per se approach had many beneficial aspects. Per
se rules are easily applied, easily understood deterrents to anticom-
petitive conduct. The widespread use of per se rules conserved the
resources of the judicial system and of private litigants by making
trials shorter and less expensive. Because so many restraints were
deemed illegal on their face, American firms clearly were aware of the
types of competitive conduct that they should avoid. 16
The dominance of the per se rule, however, also caused some
significant problems. The per se approach was rigid and formalistic.
By mechanically precluding certain conduct without any consideration
of its economic effects, the rule deterred beneficial as well as perni-
cious business practices.17 Soon after the Schwinn decision, antitrust
commentators began to point out the inconsistences between the per
se rule and an economics-based approach to antitrust analysis: under
certain circumstances, a particular restraint on competition could
11. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967).
12. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966); Kior's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
13. See Earl E. Pollock, The "New Antitrust"--Its Implications for the Practitioner, 54
Antitrust L. J. 51, 52 (1985) (placing Schwinn among a group of Supreme Court cases reflecting
the antitrust "fever" of the late 1960s).
14. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58.
15. Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 382.
16. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 n.10 (stating that "[w]ithout the per se rules, business-
men would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will
find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act").
17. Supporters of a per se approach argue, however, that its occasional overbreadth is
justified by its efficiency. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 Antitrust L. J. 135, 157 (1984) (stating that courts accept the occasional overbreadth
of the per se rule because most of the practices it condemns are anticompetitive, and a case-by-
case approach would allow too many of these anticompetitive practices to persist). In Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982), the Supreme Court stated: "As in
every rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect.
For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of
some agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." See also FTC
v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 440 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that "[w]e have freely admitted that conduct condemned under
theper se rule sometimes would be permissible if subjected merely to rule-of-reason analysis").
1756 [Vol. 47:1753
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promote economic efficiency, yet the per se rule left no room for con-
sideration of such beneficial effects. 18
III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE RULE OF REASON
Disillusionment with the rigidity of the per se rule soon led to
limitations on its use and a corresponding broadening of the rule of
reason. After the high water mark of per se analysis in the 1967
Schwinn case,19 the federal judiciary began to rethink certain applica-
tions of the rule.20 The most dramatic retreat from per se analysis
occurred in 1977 when, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., the Supreme Court reversed its decision in Schwinn and decided
that nonprice vertical restrictions should be judged by the rule of
reason.2' At issue in GTE Sylvania was a contractual requirement
that distributors sell Sylvania television sets only from authorized
locations.22 The Court recognized that, although this requirement
limited competition among the distributors in the resale of Sylvania
televisions ("intrabrand competition"), it also promoted competition
with other brands of television sets ('interbrand competition") by
inducing Sylvania distributors to make the investments necessary to
provide more services to customers.23 The Court pointed out that,
"[d]eparture from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line
drawing.'2 4 The Court concluded that a rule of reason rather than a
per se approach was appropriate in light of the potential economic
benefits of the location clause imposed by GTE Sylvania.25
The history of antitrust analysis since GTE Sylvania has been,
with only a few exceptions, a steady erosion of the per se approach to
18. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 297 (1975) (noting that the application of the per se rule to resale price
maintenance prevents the consideration of beneficial effects such as improved point-of-sale
services). See also Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust
Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 Hastings L. J. 471, 475-76 (1987).
19. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
20. This rethinking was a result of the increased exposure of federal judges to economic
theory during the 1970s. See note 5 and accompanying text.
21. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58.
22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. at 54-55.
24. Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 54-57.
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analyzing Section 1 conduct and an expanded use of the rule of reason
to consider a restraint's economic impact.26 In 1979 the Supreme
Court indicated for the first time that it would be willing to apply a
rule of reason analysis to a price-fixing arrangement. The Court held
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS27 that a group of copyright holders did
not commit a per se violation of Section 1 when they fixed a common
price for the licensing of their musical compositions.28 The Court
pointed out that, instead of engaging in a rigid per se analysis, the
courts should initially consider whether a restraint "appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.29 The Court concluded that the common license
allowed the copyright holders to market their compositions more
efficiently and therefore should be upheld under the rule of reason.30
During the 1980s the Supreme Court extended the rule of
reason to other horizontal agreements with potential efficiency justifi-
cations. In NCAA v. Board of Regents,31 the Court used the rule of
reason to analyze the NCAA's limitations on the number of times its
member college sports teams could appear on television and the fees
they could receive from the networks. Despite the fact that these
restrictions were similar to the type of price and output restrictions
that previously had been considered illegal per se, the Court agreed to
consider the defendants' arguments that the restrictions had a pro-
competitive purpose (that is, making possible the marketing of ama-
teur collegiate athletics).32
The Court also declined to apply the per se rule to a group
boycott in Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary &
Printing Co.33 The plaintiff claimed that its expulsion from a whole-
26. See M. Laurence Popofsky and David B. Goodwin, The '-Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason
Revisited, 56 Antitrust L. J. 195, 196 (1987) (noting that, since GTE Sylvania, courts examine
the competitive effects of restraints that would once have been immediately condemned under
the per se rule). Indeed, as one commentator has pointed out, "the momentum appears to
remain with those who would limit or eliminate per se categories, if not the entire concept of per
se antitrust illegality." Beschle, 38 Hastings L. J. at 497 (cited in note 18).
27. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
28. Id. at 24-25.
29. Id. at 19-20.
30. Id. at 20.
31. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
32. The Court ultimately found the television restrictions illegal under the rule of reason
because they were broader than required to promote amateur collegiate athletics. Id. at 104-20.
33. 472 U.S. 284 (1985). Prior to Northwest Wholesale, the per se rule had been firmly
established for group boycotts. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 145;
Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212; Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 668 (1941);
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 603 (1914).
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sale purchasing cooperative for office supplies should be illegal on its
face. The Court held, however, that the per se rule should not apply
because the plaintiff had failed to make a threshold showing that "the
cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element
essential to effective competition. 34  Similarly, FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists3 5 involved an association of dentists who re-
fused to supply patient x-rays to insurance companies seeking to
evaluate benefit claims. Although it ultimately found this practice il-
legal under the rule of reason, the Court declined "to resolve this case
by forcing the Federation's policy into the 'boycott' pigeonhole and
invoking the per se rule."16
In a line of cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court also limited
the use of the per se rule in vertical restraint cases. In Jefferson
Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,3 7 the Court held that, before
invoking the per se rule for a tying arrangement, a plaintiff would
have to show that a defendant possessed a significant share of the
tying product market38 In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,39
the Court refused to infer a per se illegal resale price-fixing
conspiracy from a manufacturer's receipt of price-cutting complaints
from its distributors.40 Furthermore, in Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.,41 the Court concluded that the per se rule
should not apply even when a manufacturer and dealer expressly
agreed to terminate a competing dealer who was price cutting.
According to the Court, the per se rule would be appropriate only
when the manufacturer and remaining dealer agreed on the specific
prices to be charged by the dealer in the future.42
During the last fifteen years, many lower federal courts have
followed enthusiastically the Supreme Court's lead in limiting appli-
cations of the per se rule and expanding the use of the rule of reason. 43
Indeed, in their desire to consider the potential economic efficiencies
34. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 296.
35. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
36. Id. at 458.
37. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
38. Id. at 16-18.
39. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
40. Id. at 764.
41. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
42. Id. at 726-27, 734-35.
43. See, for example, Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d 210 (allowing requirement that agents of
van lines not deal with other moving companies); National Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA
U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986) (upholding interchange fee among members of VISA
credit card system); Polk, 776 F.2d 185 (upholding noncompetition covenant).
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of defendants' conduct, some lower federal courts have gone beyond
the Supreme Court's mandate. In Rothery Storage and Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines," for example, Judge Bork concluded that the
Supreme Court, by virtue of its decisions in Broadcast Music, NCAA,
and Northwest Wholesale, had implicitly overruled the per se illegality
of territorial allocations among competitors. 45
IV. DEFICIENCIES IN CURRENT RuLE OF REASON ANALYSIS
As a result of the revolution in antitrust economics that oc-
curred within the federal judiciary in the 1980s, the rule of reason
now has become the dominant form of analysis in Section 1 cases. To
date, however, neither the federal courts, enforcement agencies, nor
antitrust commentators have been able to devise an effective means of
applying the rule.46
It is ironic that, in an era of its supposed predominance, the
rule of reason has been applied so infrequently at the trial level. Most
judicial discussion of the rule of reason standard has occurred in the
Supreme Court and federal appellate courts, where the analysis has
largely been confined to the issue of whether a rule of reason or per se
standard should apply.47 Once the courts have decided that the rule
of reason is appropriate, they have usually neglected to explain how it
should be applied on remand.
44. 792 F.2d 210.
45. Id. at 226. The Supreme Court found horizontal territorial allocation to be per se ille-
gal in Topco, 405 U.S. at 611; United States v. Sealy Corp., 388 U.S. 350, 355 (1967); and
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 595, 598 (1951). Despite Judge Borls
opinion, these cases are still valid precedents for the analysis of Section 1 conduct. Topco, in
fact, was cited with approval by the Court in its recent decision in Sharp, 485 U.S. at 734.
46. See Clanton, 30 Wayne L. Rev. at 1249 (cited in note 9); see also note 74 and accompa-
nying text.
47. See, for example, GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58 (applying rule of reason to non-
price vertical restraints); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24-25 (applying rule of reason to
horizontal price-fixing arrangement); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648
(1980) (applying per se rule to horizontal agreement to fix credit terms); Maricopa, 457 U.S. at
348 (applying per se rule to maximum price-fixing agreement); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31
(refusing to apply the per se rule to a tying arrangement where the defendant lacked market
power); Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 298 (applying rule of reason to group boycott where
the defendant lacked market power or exclusive access to an element essential to competition);
Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458-59 (applying rule of reason to dentists' concerted
refusal to deal with insurers); Sharp, 485 U.S. at 726 (applying rule of reason to termination of
price-cutting distributor at behest of competing distributor); Bailey's, Inc. v. Windsor America,
Inc., 948 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying rule of reason to distributor termination); ES
Development v. RWM Enterprises, 939 F.2d 547, 557 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying per se rule to
agreement between dealers).
1760
SHERMAN ACT
Trial courts also have had little experience in using the rule of
reason because plaintiffs are reluctant to bring rule of reason cases ab
initio. Indeed, the risk/reward ratio is prohibitive for plaintiffs con-
sidering rule of reason cases. First of all, such cases are extremely
expensive to pursue. In order to prove a defendant's market power,
the plaintiff must introduce lengthy testimony from economists and
extensive documentary evidence from other competitors.48
Furthermore, a plaintiff's chances of prevailing in a rule of reason
case are quite low. The rule of reason, in fact, often has been viewed
as a rule of per se legality.49 Faced with such high costs and uncertain
outcomes, many plaintiffs simply have elected not to pursue rule of
reason cases.50
Because it is used so infrequently, the rule of reason has atro-
phied in the federal courts. Indeed, most courts' definitions of the
rule have not progressed beyond a requirement that the trier of fact
consider all the circumstances surrounding a restraint before
condemning it.51  The courts simply quote "a long list of factors
without any indication of priority or weight to be accorded each factor.
... '"52 Such a vague approach gives little guidance to litigants, judges,
or juries. The classic formulation of the rule of reason, set forth by
Justice Brandeis in 1918 in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,53
included such factors as the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's
business, the conditions before and after the restraint, the nature and
48. See note 62 and accompanying text.
49. See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
933, 936 (1987) (stating that the application of the rule of reason rarely results in a finding of
illegality due to the plaintiffs difficult burden of proof); John J. Flynn and James F. Ponsoldt,
Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical
Analysis in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1125, 1143 (1987) (stating
that the rule of reason as applied in GTE Sylvania effectively made vertical customer and
territorial restraints per se lawful).
50. For example, during the 18 years since the GTE Sylvania decision, very few cases
have been brought challenging the legality of nonprice vertical restrictions under the rule of
reason. The paucity of such cases is not surprising in light of the fact that, during such period,
only two courts have found nonprice vertical restrictions to be illegal, and in each of those cases
there was some involvement by competing distributors that brought into question the vertical
nature of the restraints. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1578
(11th Cir. 1983) (involving airtight territorial restrictions imposed by manufacturer that
competed with its distributors in resale of its own product); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America,
622 F.2d 1068, 1081 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving requirement that distributors pay warranty pass-
over fee when selling in each other's territory).
51. Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 Antitrust L. J. 3, 14 (1987)
52. Popofsky and Goodwin, 56 Antitrust L. J. at 198 (cited in note 26) (quoting Robert
Pitofsy, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 34 (1978)).
53. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the restraint.M
The rule of reason was no more advanced by the end of the century.
The Court in GTE Sylvania simply repeated Justice Brandeis' open-
ended 1918 formula.15 Again, in Sharp in 1988, the Court merely
cited GTE Sylvania's broad definition without any further explana-
tion.56
A few courts and commentators have attempted to refine rule
of reason analysis. Their approach has been based on the assumption
that a defendant must possess market power in order to affect compe-
tition adversely in any relevant market.57 As one commentator has
stated, "antitrust policy is aimed primarily at preventing firms from
achieving, retaining, or abusing market power."' 8 Thus several courts
have held that, as a threshold issue, a plaintiff must prove that a
defendant had a market share in excess of a particular percentage. If
the plaintiff fails to prove market power, the restraint is deemed legal
and the analysis is at an end.59 This so-called market share safe har-
54. Id. at 238.
55. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
56. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 723.
57. See, for example, United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating that "[m]arket power... is essentially a 'surrogate for detrimental effects' (quoting
Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61)). See also Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984
Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency and the Per Se
Rule, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1019, 1056 (1984) (stating that "[m]arket power is at the heart of any
inquiry under the rule of reason"). As then Professor Easterbrook stated:
Few fi-ms have substantial power over price. Firms that lack [market] power cannot
injure competition no matter how hard they try. They may injure a few consumers, or a
few rivals, or themselves.., by selecting "anticompetitive" tactics. When the fin-ms lack
market power, though, they cannot sustain deleterious practices. Rival firms will offer
the consumers better deals. The process of rivalry is sufficient insurance. Rivals' better
offers will stamp out bad practices faster than the judicial process can.
Easterbrook, 53 Antitrust L. J. at 159 (cited in note 17). See also David L. White, Antitrust
Enforcement Through a Sharpened Rule of Reason, 20 Ariz. St. L. J. 749, 760 (1988) (stating
that the economic rationale for a market power requirement is that "[wlithout market power,
the defendant[ I cannot effectively raise price or restrict output"); Alden F. Abbott, Joint
Production Ventures: The Case for Antitrust Reform, 58 Antitrust L. J. 715, 732 (1989)
(proposing a structured rule of reason for determining the legality of joint ventures that
considers the effect of the joint venture on market power); Joe Sims, Developments in
Agreements Among Competitors, 58 Antitrust L. J. 433, 439 (1989) (noting that the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department will only try to determine if a restriction analyzed under the
rule of reason actually will generate efficiencies if the restriction will enhance or create market
power).
58. George A. Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 Antitrust L. J. 807, 807 (1992).
59. See General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th
Cir. 1984) (stating that in rule of reason analysis, "the plaintiff first [must] prove that the
defendant has sufficient market power to restrain competition substantially... If not, the
inquiry is at an end; the practice is lawful").
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bor has become standard in nonprice vertical restraint cases.60 A few
courts also have used the approach for horizontal restraints.61
The market share safe harbor, however, does not improve the
rule of reason standard in any meaningful manner. Indeed, it focuses
on the most difficult factor under the rule of reason. By making an
analysis of market power the first and most important step under the
rule of reason, the courts have imposed an even greater burden on
plaintiffs. Proof of market power is "difficult, complex, expensive and
time-consuming,"62 involving a fact-intensive assessment of the rele-
vant product and geographic market, each of the parties' shares of
those markets, and their competitors' market shares. Most plaintiffs
simply cannot afford the costs of a market power case. If plaintiffs
are required to prove market power as a condition to reaching a jury,
they "may simply forgo a lawsuit."63
60. Cases requiring that a plaintiff alleging the unreasonableness of a non-price vertical
restraint make a threshold showing that the defendant possesses market power include Ryko
Mfg. Co. v. Eden Services, 823 F.2d 1215, 1231 (8th Cir. 1987); Assam Drug Co., Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1986); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430,
1435 (7th Cir. 1986); Hand v. Central Transport, Inc., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985); Jack
Walters & Sons v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1984); General Leaseways, 744
F.2d at 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Graphic Products, 717 F.2d at 1568 (11th Cir. 1983); Valley Liquors,
Inc. v. Renfield Importers, 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart
Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351,
1370 (5th Cir. 1980); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1978).
61. Horizontal cases requiring the threshold market power showing include Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 895 F.2d 353, 359 (7th Cir. 1990); Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v.
Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1989); General Leaseways,
744 F.2d at 596; Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 217. Use of a market power screen in horizontal
cases, however, remains controversial. The courts have been split over the extent to which the
defendant's market power should be considered in such cases. As the Eleventh Circuit stated,
"[w]hether the court ... must weigh the market power of the antitrust defendant is a curiously
confused and uncertain area of the law." National Bancard, 779 F.2d at 603. The Supreme
Court itself has been willing to dispense with market power analysis in certain horizontal
restraint cases, while deeming market power a critical issue in others. Compare NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984) (stating that "[als a matter
of law, the absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or
output ) with Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 294-98 (requiring proof of market power for
illegality of collective refusal to deal). In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers'Assn, 493 U.S.
411, the Supreme Court criticized the potential for a market share safe harbor to introduce the
"enormous complexities of market definition into every price-fixing case." Id. at 430-31 (quoting
Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself298 (Basic Books, 1978)).
62. Philip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 Antitrust L. J. 27, 28
(1985). See also Richard S. Markovits, The American Antitrust Laws on the Centennial of the
Sherman Act: A Critique of the Statutes Themselves, Their Interpretation, and Their Operation,
38 Buff. L. Rev. 673, 752 (1990) (arguing that "market-oriented approaches are inevitably cost-
ineffective").
63. S. Rep. No. 102-42, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1991) (presenting views in support of S.
429 by Senators Metzenbaum, Biden, Kennedy, Leahy, Simon, and Roth). See also Eugene
Crew and Richard Grossman, Antitrust Litigation Reform: A Modest Proposal, Antitrust 41, 41-
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The current rule of reason standard exacts considerable social
costs beyond its disadvantage to plaintiffs. Even with the refinement
of a market power safe harbor, the rule of reason remains vague and
undefined. The market power screen provides no guidance on how a
court should balance the potential anticompetitive effects and effi-
ciencies of a restraint once a plaintiff has met its initial burden of
proving market power. The courts have not identified the types of
efficiencies that would justify defendants' exercise of market power
nor the evidentiary weight that should be afforded specific efficiency
claims. Defendants as well as plaintiffs incur greater costs in defend-
ing cases under a standard which gives so few guidelines for judges
and juries to follow.6 The time and expense of rule of reason cases
are an added burden to the federal courts, which with their current
backlog of cases can ill afford to waste their limited resources. 5 The
current standard provides little guidance to firms attempting to plan
their conduct. Antitrust enforcement relies primarily on self-policing
by the business community, but voluntary compliance is impossible
when antitrust standards are unclear. The "gray area" between per-
42 (Summer 1993) (explaining that the growing evidentiary burden in antitrust litigation has
greatly increased the cost and delay of such suits). A current commissioner of the Federal
Trade Commission has described the "exhaustive and exhausting document production by the...
parties both in and close to the market, endless debates about elasticity of supply and demand,
and all the minutiae that may need to be tied down in a full rule of reason case" Mark L.
Azcuenaga, Market Power as a Screen in Evaluating Horizontal Restraints, 60 Antitrust L. J.
935, 940 (1992). Indeed, the commissioner concluded that, when a market power inquiry is
required under the rule of reason, most "cases would not be brought simply because the litiga-
tion cost would outweigh the benefits of the case...." Id. at 936. In Denny's Marina, Inc. v.
Renfro Productions, Inc., 8 F.3d 1217 (7th Cir. 1993), the court stated that, under the rule of
reason, a plaintiff "simply cannot afford the elaborate market analysis and expert witnesses
required to make... a showing [of adverse market effects]." Id. at 1221.
64. Judge Easterbrook has commented:
Faced with a list of such imponderables, lawyers must engage in ceaseless discovery
(they might find something bearing on a factor, and the factor might be dispositive).
The higher the stakes-and stakes are very high in antitrust-the more fnms are
willing to spend on discovery and litigation. The marginal week of discovery or trial just
might mean saving a few million or tens of millions of dollars. Litigation costs are the
product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination
more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the rule of reason.
Easterbrook, 53 Antitrust L. J. at 155 (cited in note 17).
65. As one commentator noted:
Nor is it just the antitrust plaintiff whose burden has been increased by the Supreme
Court decisions. A much greater burden has been imposed on defendants and on the
courts as well. To require more evidence to prove a violation is to require more
discovery and longer trials and greater resources from plaintiffs, defendants and the
courts just to be able to collect, process, and consider the additional evidence now
deemed necessary.
Robert B. Reich, The Work Of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism 38-39
(A.A. Knopf, 1991).
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missible and illegal conduct is much broader now that a vague rule of
reason has supplanted the per se rule for so many types of competi-
tive conduct. Given the high costs of litigation and potential liability
under the antitrust laws, businesses likely will take a conservative
approach and avoid any conduct that falls within a gray area.66 Such
hesitancy may prevent firms from entering into business arrange-
ments that enhance productivity and benefit consumers.6 7
In their attempts to avoid an arbitrary per se rule, the federal
courts have gone to the opposite extreme. They have established, as
the prevailing method of analysis for Section 1 conduct, a formless
standard that requires the trier of fact to consider all conceivable
economic circumstances before rendering a decision on the legality of
a particular restraint. The courts have assumed that such a multi-
faceted approach will allow them to render economically correct deci-
sions.68 The courts, however, are mistaken in that assumption. It is
unrealistic to expect judges and juries to make the complex economic
decisions required by the rule of reason. While judges and juries are
adept at determining "who did what, when, and why,"69 they are ill
equipped to decide economic issues. They lack the sophisticated
economic training necessary to balance the likely anticompetitive
effects of a particular restraint against its potential efficiencies.70
66. One commentator has noted how antitrust law has moved from the clear standards of
the past "into a gray area where it is possible for a case to come out one way--or another."
Betty Bock, Is Antitrust Dead? 10 (The Conference Board, 1989). Another commentator has
reflected on the high cost to the business community resulting from the confusion over antitrust
standards: "Uncertainty is a high-cost commodity. Indeed, the business community... might
find uncertainty more costly than clear and wrong rules." Sims, 58 Antitrust L. J. at 440 (cited
in note 57). See also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1020, 1043-44 (1987) (stating.
"[a]ntitrust rules that require complex and convoluted analysis in individual cases reduce
planning certainty and thereby raise business costs").
67. Many American firms, for example, have been deterred from entering into joint
ventures for the production of new products out of a fear of antitrust liability. See Thomas S.
Jorde and David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 High Tech. L. J. 1, 36 (1989)
(stating that "[current U.S. antitrust law needlessly inhibits strategic alliances designed to
develop and commercialize new technology").
68. "he courts want to render correct judgments. Since economic consequences are hard
to predict, the courts should consider all consequences of the allegedly illegal action before
condemning it." Crane, 56 Antitrust L. J. at 14 (cited in note 51). See also Flynn and Ponsoldt,
62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1143 (cited in note 49) (explaining that when the Supreme Court applies an
"undefined rule of reason to vertical customer and territorial restraints" it "effectively [makes]
them per se lawful").
69. Crane, 56 Antitrust L. J. at 15.
70. '[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems.... [They
are] ill-equipped and ill-suited for such decision-making [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and
evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to
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Economists themselves cannot agree on the economic impact of many
types of business conduct. 71 If economists cannot effectively evaluate
the market effects of particular competitive practices, judges and
juries cannot be expected to do so.72
In order to render effective decisions, judges and juries must
be given objective standards by which to judge economic behavior.
Traditional per se rules may have been too harsh on certain types of
conduct, but they did provide triers of fact a clear and consistent
means of judging anticompetitive behavior. Yet, the global inquiry
required by the rule of reason provides no guidance as to how eco-
nomic conduct should be judged. Instead, it simply allows judges and
juries to "set sail on a sea of doubt" under a "shifting, vague, and inde-
terminate" standard. 73 In order to achieve consistent results, the
courts must adopt a new method for analyzing Section 1 conduct.74
bear on such decisions."' Easterbrook, 53 Antitrust L. J. at 155 (cited in note 17) (quoting Topco,
405 U.S. at 609-12) (alteration in original). See also Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343 (stating that
"[judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to
determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition").
71. It is fantastic to suppose that judges (and juries) could carry out the evaluation en-
tailed
in such a search. The [consumer] welfare implications of most forms of business conduct
are beyond the ken of almost all economists. If you assembled 12 economists and gave
them all available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget,
you would not soon (or ever) get unanimous agreement about whether the practice pro-
moted consumers' welfare or economic efficiency more broadly defined. They would in-
evitably discover some gaps in the data, some avenues requiring further exploration. At
least one of the economists would construct a new model showing how the practice could
reduce efficiency if certain things (unknowable from the data) were present. A global
inquiry invites no answer-, it puts too many things in issue.... To get an answer to a
practical problem, you must start with some assumptions and fixed points of reference.
Easterbrook, 53 Antitrust L. J. at 153.
72. As Professor Sullivan has concluded, "economics does not comprehend enough and
law, without extreme transformations in its own structure, cannot adequately deal with all that
economics does comprehend." Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust §
2 at 10 (West, 1977). Judge Bork points out that "the interaction of law and social sciences has
been termed a process of cross-sterilization." Speech by Judge Robert Bork, Putman, Hayes &
Barlett, Inc. Conference on Law and Economics (Sept. 30, 1988).
73. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283-84 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899). As Judge Easterbrook stated more recently, "Of course judges cannot do what
such open-ended formulas require. When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive."
Easterbrook, 53 Antitrust L. J. at 155 (cited in note 17).
74. Reformed rule of reason approaches proposed by the federal courts, academics, and the
enforcement agencies to date have done little to remedy the deficiencies of the rule. The federal
courts' market share safe harbor will simply increase the courts' consideration of the most
difficult factor in rule of reason analysis. See note 62 and accompanying text. The Federal
Trade Commission set forth a proposed rule of reason approach in its decision in Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. at 586-88. The Commission's approach balances
a defendant's efficiency justifications against the potential anticompetitive effects of a restraint.
Id. at 587-88. The Commission, however, has provided no guidance on how such balancing
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The history of Section 1 analysis reveals that neither a tradi-
tional per se nor a standard rule of reason approach to the analysis of
competitive restrictions is desirable. The per se approach is too arbi-
trary, while a rule of reason standard is too ambiguous. The ideal
analysis of Section 1 conduct would retain the advantages of the per
se and rule of reason approaches while avoiding their pitfalls. It
would combine the clarity of the per se rule with the substantive
economic inquiry of the rule of reason. The approach would provide
clear standards under which the courts could determine when the
beneficial or anticompetitive aspects of particular Section 1 restraints
are predominating. It is now appropriate for courts to implement a
new approach to Section 1 conduct that realistically could achieve
these goals.
V. A NEW STANDARD FOR SECTION 1 CONDUCT
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to promote the type of com-
petitive behavior that maximizes consumer welfare by delivering the
highest possible output of goods and services at the lowest possible
prices.75 Firms are most likely to achieve such goals when they oper-
should be carried out. Id. at 604. The Department of Justice recently proposed a rule of reason
analysis for health care joint ventures in its Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health Care
Area, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,150 (Sept. 15, 1993) ("Health Care Guidelines").
Anne Bingaman, the Assistant Attorney General heading up the Antitrust Division, recently
stated that the rule of reason approach in the Health Care Guidelines "would be applied in other
markets." Interview: Anne K. Bingaman, Antitrust 8, 10 (Fall 1993). The Health Care
Guidelines, like the FTC's proposed rule of reason approach, fail to explain how a judge or jury
should determine the exact anticompetitive effects or efficiencies that are likely to result from a
particular restraint and, once determined, how one should be balanced against the other. They
also require a market analysis as the initial step under the rule of reason. Health Care
Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,151 at 20,759, 20,765. Academic suggestions for
changes in the rule of reason have been no more effective than the solutions posed by the
federal courts and enforcement agencies. Most such suggestions rely on market power as the
critical factor in the proposed analysis. See, for example, Thomas H. Jorde and David J. Teece,
Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance
Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 Antitrust L. J. 579, 616 (1993) (proposing "sliding
scale" under which "the greater plaintiff's proof of defendants' market power, the greater
defendants' burden of establishing pro-competitive benefits").
75. See Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 Antitrust L. J.
21, 24 (1985) (analyzing the legislative history of antitrust laws); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1703 (1986) (stating that "[h]owever you slice
the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges.
This turns out to be the same program as one based on efficiency" (footnote omitted)); Eleanor
M. Fox and Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We
Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 945 (1987) (discussing the view
that "the sole purpose of antitrust is to prevent inefficient allocation of resources").
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ate in highly competitive markets. Firms that are subject to intense
rivalry are forced to enhance their productivity in order to survive,
and distribution of manufacturers and the development of new
products and services occur most frequently in markets with a
diversity of players.76 Such innovations, however, do not always
result from a "go it alone" strategy. In many cases firms can enhance
their efficiency more effectively by collaborating with others than by
pursuing an independent course. By forming strategic alliances with
their competitors, firms can access technology, capital, or other assets
that will enable them to produce new products, enter new markets, or
improve their efficiency in existing markets. By cooperating on
programs to offer an increased level of services to customers,
manufacturers and their dealers can enhance their effectiveness in
the interbrand market. The courts' task in judging Section 1 conduct,
therefore, is to distinguish between collaborations that unduly limit
competition and those that promote the parties' efficiency in the
relevant market. As the Supreme Court stated in Broadcast Music:
"[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether.., the practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to
'increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive."' 7
76. Said one commentator
Put simply, global competition is a bit like tennis: You get better by playing against
people who are better than you.... [Managers and engineers do not arrive at these
innovations because they are smarter, work harder or are better educated than their
peers. No. They do so because they must. They are subjected to intense global
competition, where constantly pushing the boundaries of productivity is the price of the
ticket in the door. The converse is true as well. Most of the productivity laggards have
been protected from the painful rigors of global competition by governments.
William Lewis, The Secret to Competitiveness, Wall Street Journal A14 (Oct. 22, 1993). See also
Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak- Understanding the Role of Market
Imperfections, 62 Antitrust L. J. 263, 268 (Winter 1994) (stating that "[c]ompetition is a force for
innovation and its rapid commercialization. A diversified economy with multiple players
decreases the control of any one player and the impact of a mistaken market decision. Diversity
increases the opportunity for commercialization of innovation and the incentive to be the first to
market new products"). A recent study by the Harvard Business School found that companies
that are most successful in global competition "compete vigorously at home and pressure each
other to improve and innovate." Richard M. Steuer, Getting It Backward on Antitrust, New York
Times F13 (Dec. 6, 1992). Another study concluded that Japanese companies that had done well
in export markets first "honed their teeth in fierce domestic competition." Id.
77. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422,441 n.16 (1978)).
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Such a theoretical approach to Section 1 conduct is uncontro-
versial.78 The problem arises when courts start to use the rule of rea-
son to balance the anticompetitive effects of a particular restraint
against its potential efficiencies. To date, the courts have assumed
that the rule of reason, as the antithesis of the per se rule, requires a
full-blown analysis of all relevant market factors. 9 The courts can
clarify Section 1 analysis by recognizing that the rule of reason and
per se rules are not opposite theoretical approaches but simply differ-
ent evidentiary standards. This recognition would free the courts to
adopt new approaches specifically tailored to the competitive charac-
teristics of the restraints at issue.
Although most courts and commentators have assumed that
the per se rule and the rule of reason are opposing standards of anti-
trust analysis, 80 they are in fact points along a continuum. In many
instances there is no "bright line" distinction between per se and rule
of reason conduct.81 Indeed, per se rules are no more than an abbrevi-
78. There is considerable precedent for viewing the rule of reason as a means of balancing
the anticompetitive effects of a restraint against its potential efficiencies. In GTE Sylvania, the
Supreme Court recognized that the legality of a nonprice vertical restraint should be
determined by balancing any harm to intrabrand competition against the benefit to interbrand
competition. 433 U.S. at 57 n.27. Although GTE Sylvania only referred to the balancing test in
a cursory manner, nearly all courts and commentators have construed GTE Sylvania to require
such an approach. See, for example, Valley Liquors, 678 F.2d at 745 (stating that courts have
interpreted GTE Sylvania to require a balancing of the effects on intrabrand and interbrand
competition in determining the legality of a restraint on distribution); Muenster Butane, 651
F.2d at 296 (reading GTE Sylvania to impose a duty on the court to determine if the net effect of
the defendant's restraint on the plaintiff was anticompetitive); Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of
America, 622 F.2d 1068, 1076 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that GTE Sylvania requires a court to
weigh "any enhancement of interbrand competition against the restrictive effect on intrabrand
competition" when examining a vertically imposed territorial restraint under the rule of reason);
Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and its "Rule of Reason" The Dealer
Termination Cases and the Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 129, 157-58
(1989) (stating that in the "free-floating cost-benefit analysis" of GTE Sylvania, "the obvious
restraint on intrabrand competition is... balanced against purported interbrand benefits").
The FTC used a balancing approach in its analysis of a joint venture between General Motors
and Toyota for the production of a compact car in the United States. See In Re General Motors
Corporation, 103 F.T.C. 374, 386-87 (1984) (stating that "the Commission weighed a number of
possible competitive concerns"). See also notes 151-52 and accompanying text. In the Health
Care Guidelines, the Department of Justice also proposes a "balancing of... efficiencies against
any potential anticompetitive effects" of joint ventures among hospitals and physicians. Health
Care Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,151 at 20,759, 20,765.
79. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
80. One commentator has referred to the "all-too-popular misunderstanding that the rule
of reason and per se approaches are polar opposites." Edward Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust
Litigation by "Facial Examination" of Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of
Reason Distinction, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1984).
81. Chief Justice Burger anticipated an end to the "bright-line" distinction between per se
and rule of reason analysis in his 1972 dissenting opinion in Topco, where he said, "[Pier se
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ated version of the rule of reason. Per se rules, like the rule of reason,
are based on courts' conclusions about the economic purpose and
effect of particular competitive restraints. The per se rule simply
represents an assumption, based on a long history of judicial experi-
ence, that the anticompetitive effects of a particular restraint will
almost always outweigh its potential efficiencies.82 The per se rule
and rule of reason differ only in the amount of analysis required to
reach a conclusion on the net competitive impact of a restraint. The
per se rule does not absolve the courts of the necessity to inquire into
the nature of the restraint at issue. Before the per se rule can be
applied, a court must determine whether the specific conduct at issue
belongs within a per se category. In some cases this determination
even involves a market power analysis.83 At the same time, the rule
of reason does not always require an elaborate market inquiry. The
rule "can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.' 4 In both
NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists, for example, the Supreme
rules... are complimentary to, and in no way inconsistent with, the rule of reason." Topco, 405
U.S. at 621 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, the Court emphasized that the purpose of both the per se rule and rule of
reason was "to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint." Id. at 692.
The Court pointed out in NCAA that the "uiltimate focus of... inquiry" under the per se rule
and rule of reason should be the competitive impact of the conduct at issue, 468 U.S. at 103, and
that "[indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from [riule of [rleason analysis."
Id. at 104 n.26.
82. In Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, the Court acknowledged that the per se rule is
based on the ultimate economic effect of Section 1 conduct: "The per se rules also reflect a
longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices by their nature have 'a substantial
potential for impact on competition.' Id. at 433 (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16). See
also Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344 (stating- "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint
enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has
applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable"); Northwest Wholesale, 472
U.S. at 289 (stating: "[tihe per se approach permits categorical judgments with respect to
certain business practices that have proved to be predominantly anticompetitive!); NCAA, 468
U.S. at 103-04 (stating: "[pier se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances make the
likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further examination of
the challenge d conduct'); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (stating that in determining
whether to characterize conduct as per se unlawful, the Court considers "whether the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output").
83. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-14 (holding that, before invoking the per se rule
for a tying arrangement, a plaintiff must show that defendant possessed a significant share of
tying-product market).
84. Areeda, 54 Antitrust L. J. at 30 (cited in note 62). As Professor Areeda has stated:
"[Tihe rule of reason is not always an open invitation to a decade of discovery and litigation.
The rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye. In Realty Multi-List,
[629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980)] the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's claim of per se
illegality, but then applied the rule of reason as the appellants watched-before their very eyes."
Id.
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Court found the defendants' conduct illegal upon a rather abbreviated
consideration and without a market power analysis. 85
The federal courts should abandon this false dichotomy be-
tween the per se and rule of reason approaches and recognize that the
objective of all Section 1 analysis is the same: to determine the sub-
stantive economic effect of defendants' conduct. In order to make that
determination, however, the courts will have to undertake varying
degrees of inquiry depending upon the type of restraint at issue. The
legality of certain restraints will be easy to determine because their
competitive effects are obvious. Other restrictions will require a more
detailed analysis because their competitive impact is more ambigu-
ous.
Section 1 conduct can be divided into a simple three-part
continuum based on the degree of analysis necessary to confirm a
restraint's impact on competition. Conduct on the continuum would
range from the most suspect to the least suspect, with more
ambiguous restraints in the middle of the continuum. Conduct within
each category would be sufficiently similar to warrant its own special
analysis. The courts could allocate evidentiary presumptions
according to the location of specific restraints on the continuum.
Conduct at the most suspect end of the continuum would be
presumptively illegal; conduct at the least suspect end would be
presumptively proper; and conduct at the middle of the continuum
would require a more detailed market power analysis:
The federal courts have been analyzing Section 1 restraints
under the Sherman Act for more than a century. They have enough
experience with such restraints to classify them rather easily along an
economic continuum. The courts already know what anticompetitive
effects and efficiencies likely will result from most types of restraints.
Horizontal price fixing, territorial allocations, and group boycotts, for
example, have been deemed per se illegal because the courts have
85. In NCAA, the Court dispensed with an elaborate market analysis and found the
television restrictions to be illegal simply because they were not necessary to promote the
NCAA's valid purpose of regulating amateur collegiate athletics. 468 U.S. at 104-20. In
Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court condemned the physicians' refusal to supply x-rays to
insurance companies after a brief analysis revealed that there was no valid economic purpose
for such refusal. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-65. Some lower federal courts
have also adopted a shorter form rule of reason. In United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629
F.2d 1351, the court held that the membership criteria adopted by a multiple listing service of
real estate brokers did not constitute a per se illegal group boycott. Nevertheless, the Court
adopted a "facial unreasonableness" test which would "void on its face any significantly
restrictive rule of a... trade association with significant market power, which lacks competitive
justification or whose reach clearly exceeds the combination's legitimate needs." Id. at 1370.
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found that they are usually anticompetitive and lack any legitimate
justification. 6 Such restraints should be classified at the presump-
tively illegal end of the continuum. On the other hand, the courts
have recognized that vertical restraints independently imposed by a
manufacturer on its distributors are almost always procompetitive. 87
Such restraints should be at the presumptively legal end of the con-
tinuum.
Thus, for most Section 1 conduct, the courts could retain the
simplicity and clear guidance of the traditional per se approach. But
the courts also could avoid the arbitrariness of the per se standard by
giving litigants an opportunity to rebut the presumptions of legality
or illegality. If a litigant failed to present enough evidence to rebut
the applicable presumption, the case could be disposed of on summary
judgment.
One of the early cases interpreting the Sherman Act provides
an effective theoretical basis for determining when a defendant has
presented enough evidence to rebut the presumptions at either ex-
treme of the Section 1 continuum. The "ancillary restraints doctrine"
was adopted before Section 1 analysis became arbitrarily divided into
per se and rule of reason categories. In 1898, in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,88 Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft concluded
that a restraint of trade should be permissible when it was "ancillary
to the main purpose of a [lawful] contract [and] was reasonably
adapted and limited to the necessary protection of a party in the
carrying out of such purpose... ."89 Under Judge Taft's approach,
restrictions necessary to promote the procompetitive purpose of an
underlying contractual integration would be allowed; however,
"naked" restraints unrelated to any such integration would be void.
Such a distinction between naked and ancillary restraints implements
the fundamental goals of the Sherman Act by encouraging restraints
that enhance efficiency while deterring those whose only purpose is to
restrict competition.
86. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
87. See notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
88. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge Taft's opinion in Addyston Pipe has been
characterized as "one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in the history of the
law." Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 26 (cited in note 61).
89. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283.
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Although not yet adopted explicitly by the Supreme Court,90
the ancillary restraints doctrine is consistent with several of the
Court's recent decisions. In those cases, the Court permitted horizon-
tal restraints necessary for the effectiveness of an integrated coopera-
tive arrangement but precluded restraints that were broader than
required for such a purpose. The price-fixing arrangement upheld by
the Court in Broadcast Music, for example, was ancillary to the
musical composers' integrated efforts to market their compositions. 91
Similarly, the membership restrictions approved in Northwest
Wholesale were necessary for the effective functioning of the
purchasing cooperative.92 The television restrictions precluded in
NCAA, however, were not required to promote the NCAA's legitimate
interest in amateur collegiate athletics.93
90. The doctrine was, however, discussed extensively in Justice Stevens's dissenting opin-
ion in Sharp, 485 U.S. at 736-39. Several lower federal courts and antitrust commentators have
concluded that the Supreme Court has implicitly adopted the ancillary restraints doctrine. See
Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 229 (stating that the Supreme Court recognized the validity of the
ancillary horizontal restraints in Northwest Wholesale, Broadcast Music, and NCAA); National
Bancard, 779 F.2d at 599 (citing Broadcast Music for the proposition that a court should
determine whether a restraint is ancillary to an agreement that will enhance efficiency); Polk,
776 F.2d at 189 (citing Addyston Pipe & Steel, Broadcast Music, and NCAA for the validity of
ancillary restraints that increase productivity); Beschle, 38 Hastings L. J. at 509 (cited in note
18) (stating that the Supreme Court upheld procompetitive ancillary restraints in Broadcast
Music); James T. Halverson, The Future of Horizontal Restraints Analysis, 57 Antitrust L. J. 33,
47 (1988) (stating that Polk, National Bancard, and Rothery Storage upheld the validity of
restraints that were found to be ancillary to productive integration).
91. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20.
92. Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 296. Indeed, Judge Bork concluded in a recent case
that Northwest Wholesales "statement of the law of ancillary restraints is so close to that of
Addyston Pipe & Steel as to be virtually indistinguishable." Rothery Storage, 792 F.2d at 229.
93. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104-20. An ancillary restraints approach would explain certain
horizontal restraint cases in which the Supreme Court continued to apply the per se rule during
the 1980s. Several commentators have been confused as to the Court's rationale for continuing
such a per se approach after Broadcast Music appeared to signal a new rule of reason approach
to horizontal restraints. See Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The
(Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 S. Ct. Rev. 319, 320 (1983) (expressing disappoint-
ment with the Court's decision in Maricopa); Beschle, 38 Hastings L. J. at 488 (cited in note 18).
In Catalano, 446 U.S. 643, the Court held that beer wholesalers who had agreed to stp extend-
ing credit to beer retailers had committed a per se violation of Section 1. Id. at 650. In
Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332, the Court applied the per se rule to an agreement among physicians to
set the maximum fees they could claim under their patients' insurance plans. Id. at 348. In
neither case was the Court willing to consider the defendants' efficiency justifications, as it had
in Broadcast Music. Catalano and Maricopa can be distinguished from Broadcast Music,
however, under an ancillary restraints approach. In Broadcast Music the copyright owners had
integrated their efforts to market their musical compositions through a common association.
Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20-21. There was no such integration in either Catalano or
Maricopa. The manufacturers in Catalano had not formed any cooperative venture, Catalano,
446 U.S. at 643-50, and the doctors in Maricopa were independent competing entrepreneurs
who had not entered into any partnership beyond the minimal tasks required to develop a
maximum fee schedule, Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356-57. There was thus no plausible argument in
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An ancillary restraints approach would be an effective method
for evaluating evidence introduced to rebut the presumptions of legal-
ity and illegality at either end of the Section 1 continuum. Such an
approach would focus on the structure and competitive purpose of the
restraints at issue and would avoid the need for a more costly market
power analysis. At the most suspect extreme of the continuum, a
defendant would have to demonstrate that horizontal price fixing,
territorial allocations, or refusals to deal were ancillary to a separate
integrated arrangement designed to enhance its efficiency. 94 On the
other hand, in order to rebut the presumption of legality for vertical
restraints, a plaintiff would have to prove that they were not ancillary
to a manufacturer's desire to enhance its interbrand efficiency, but
rather were a naked attempt by rival dealers to limit intrabrand
competition."5
The middle of the Section 1 continuum would encompass re-
straints whose competitive impact is more ambiguous. A conduct-
based approach such as the ancillary restraints analysis would be
insufficient in such cases. The courts would have to engage in a more
detailed balancing of the anticompetitive effects and potential effi-
ciencies of such restraints. Tying arrangements and joint ventures
among competitors should be classified at the middle of the contin-
uum because they are just as capable of eliminating competition as
enhancing efficiency. Their ultimate competitive effect depends on,
among other things, the parties' market power.96 As under the rule of
reason, the plaintiff should have the initial burden of proving the
market power of the parties to such restraints. The analysis of such
restraints, however, need not be as complicated as under the tradi-
tional rule of reason. By adopting a market power threshold, the
either case that the horizontal restraints at issue were related to a legitimate cooperative
arrangement. Indeed, the amicus brief filed by the government in Maricopa expressly advo-
cated an ancillary restraints approach:
Thus, if an agreement on price were necessary to cooperative economic activity, as in a
true partnership, joint venture or merger, the elimination of price rivalry would be a
facet of an integration of productive resources capable of yielding efficiencies beneficial
to competition, and would require further analysis. In the absence of such a necessary
relationship to integrated productive activity, however, an agreement among
competitors fixing prices properly is deemed a naked restraint with no purpose other
than elimination of rivalry. Such a restraint should be held "illegal on its face."
Liebeler, 33 UCLA L. Rev. at 1044 (cited in note 57) (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae 11-12, Maricopa, 457 U.S. 332).
94. See notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
95. See notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
96. See notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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courts could dispose of many of these cases on summary judgment.
The courts can also use objective standards to determine when the
efficiency justifications for such restraints outweigh their potential
anticompetitive effects.
The following chart summarizes the types of analysis that
would apply to specific conduct under the new Section 1 approach. It
would be progressively more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail as the
continuum moves from the most suspect to the least suspect types of
conduct. At the beginning of the continuum, the plaintiff could take
advantage of a presumption of illegality. At the middle of the contin-
uum, however, the burden would shift to the plaintiff to prove the
defendant's market power. Finally, at the continuum's end, the plain-
tiff would have to rebut a presumption of legality in order to prevail.
Most
Suspect
Least
Suspect
Easiest for
Plaintiff
to Prevail
Easiest for
Defendant
to Prevail
VI. THE ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF CONDUCT
A Presumptively Illegal Restraints
Horizontal price fixing, territorial allocations, and group boy-
cotts should be classified at the presumptively illegal end of the Sec-
tion 1 continuum. The courts have traditionally applied the per se
Conduct Horizontal price Tying and Vertical
fixing, territorial exclusive dealing restraints
allocations, and
group boycotts
Type of Ancillary Market power Ancillary
Analysis restraints analysis restraints
I analysis analysis
Burden Burden on Burden on Burden on
of Proof defendant to plaintiff to prove plaintiff to
rebut presump- market power rebut
tion of illegality presumption
of legality
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rule to such restraints because, in most cases, they have a clear anti-
competitive effect and lack efficiency justifications. These practices
invariably raise prices, reduce output, and limit consumers' range of
choices. Indeed, such direct restrictions on interfirm rivalry strike at
the heart of the open competitive system that the antitrust laws were
designed to protect.9 7
The adverse effects of horizontal price-fixing agreements are
obvious. Competitors restrict the free play of market forces when
they agree to raise, lower, fix, or stabilize prices in concert.98 Indirect
price-fixing schemes (such as bans on competitive bidding, restrictions
on production, and certain exchanges of price information) have the
same anticompetitive impact.9 9 Horizontal territorial allocations and
group boycotts are no less pernicious. In fact, horizontal territorial
allocation often has a more adverse effect on competition than hori-
zontal price fixing.100 The parties to a price-fixing arrangement may
97. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text. See also Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic
Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1020, 1023 (1987) (stating that "[IThe economic goal of antitrust policy is to increase the
material welfare of society through the instrument of interfirm rivalry").
98. See United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (approving per
se illegality of any conspiracy among competitors designed to raise, lower, fix, or stabilize prices
on the grounds that such conspiracies directly interfere with "the free play of market forces").
99. See Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692-96 (holding illegal a ban on competitive
bidding); Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 464-66 (holding illegal a refusal by dentists
to provide patients' x-rays to insurers); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333, 337-38 (1969) (holding illegal the exchange of price information); Chicago Professional
Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding illegal the
reduction by a sports league of the number of games broadcast).
100. The courts have consistently applied the per se rule to horizontal territorial alloca-
tions as well as to horizontal price fixing. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 (applying per se rule to
horizontal territorial allocation); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078,
1089 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying per se rule to horizontal customer allocation); United States v.
Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating that territorial
allocation of markets is unreasonable per se). Before Topco all horizontal market division cases
decided by the Supreme Court involved ancillary price restraints. See Sealy, 388 U.S. at 356
(stating that "[t]he territorial restraints were a part of the unlawful price fixing and policing';
Timken Roller Bearing, 341 U.S. at 595-96 (noting that the defendant agreed to allocate trade
territories and to fix prices on products sold outside an allocated territory). Topco, however,
involved horizontal market division without any ancillary price fixing, and the Court indicated
that such restraints should be deemed per se illegal. 405 U.S. at 609 n.9. Several
commentators have concluded that horizontal market division is as great an evil as horizontal
price fixing. See Posner, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 292 (cited in note 18) (noting that, in some
respects, horizontal territorial allocation is an easier method of cartelization than price fixing
because the participants do not have to agree on a price, and will not dissipate cartel profits
through nonprice competition); Peter J. Monter, Comment, Restricted Distribution After
'Schwinn," 9 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L. Rev. 1032, 1040-41 (1968) (discussing the effects of
horizontal market division); Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing
Distributors: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1160, 1163 (1979) (stating that
horizontal exclusionary agreements should be condemned per se).
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continue to compete with each other in certain non-price areas, such
as customer service. Customer and territorial allocations, however,
eliminate all competition among the parties, whether price or non-
price o101
Group boycotts directly eliminate competition by excluding
firms from particular markets. The "group boycott" term has been
used rather loosely in antitrust cases and academic literature, and
thus there is considerable confusion over what type of conduct should
be classified as a boycott.10 2 In recent cases, however, the Supreme
Court has clarified that the classic group boycott occurs when firms
attempt to deny their competitors access to a supplier, customer, or
facility necessary to compete in the relevant market.03 The Court has
found group boycotts per se illegal when dealers induced a manufac-
turer not to deal with a competing dealer,10 4 when membership in or
the approval of a self-regulatory organization was arbitrarily denied
to a particular competitor,o5 or when firms could not access a joint
venture essential for effectivecompetition in a particular market.06
The anticompetitive effects of horizontal price fixing, territorial
allocations, and group boycotts are clear enough to excuse the plaintiff
from a demonstration of the defendant's market power. A
presumption of illegality for these restraints would preserve the
simplicity and deterrent effect of the current per se approach to such
conduct. When the detrimental effects of a restraint are apparent,
101. See Beschle, 38 Hastings L. J. at 479.80 (cited in note 18).
102. As the Supreme Court stated in Northwest Wholesale, "[t~here is more confusion about
the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other
aspect of the per se doctrine." 472 U.S. at 294 (quoting Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of
Antitrust § 83 at 229-30 (cited in note 72)).
103. See Northwest Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 293-95 (explaining cases in which group boycotts
have been invalidated); Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458 (stating that the per se
rule is applied to situations where "firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in
order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor").
104. See General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 132-36 (involving Chevrolet dealers' inducement
of General Motors not to deal with competing discounters); Klors, 359 U.S. at 209 (involving an
appliance dealer who induced manufacturers and distributors to sell only at discriminatory
prices to a competing appliance dealer).
105. See Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658 (1961)
(involving the denial of a seal of approval by an industry association); Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 344 (1963) (analyzing an expulsion from the New York Stock
Exchange).
106. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945) (involving a denial of access
to a news-gathering service); United States v. Terninal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224
U.S. 383, 404-05 (1912) (addressing a denial of access to railroad terminal). But see Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 296 (finding that the expulsion of a member from purchasing
cooperative could not be per se illegal because the cooperative was not "essential to effective
competition" in the relevant market).
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there is no need to inquire into market power. The Supreme Court
recognized in NCAA that "as a matter of law, the absence of proof of
market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or
output.'' 107 If a restraint is clearly anticompetitive on its face, the
burden should shift to the defendant to come forward with proof of
some procompetitive virtue that justifies the restraint.108
Some antitrust commentators have argued that plaintiffs
should have the initial burden of proving market power even for such
horizontal restraints as price fxing. They have emphasized that only
firms with market power can injure competition over a meaningful
period because the marketplace ultimately will undercut the effec-
tiveness of any anticompetitive restraints as consumers switch to
substitutes or new firms enter the market.10 9 There are, however,
several reasons to dispense with a market power analysis of horizon-
107. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109.
108. See Brown University, 5 F.3d at 674 (stating that "the absence or inconclusivity of a
finding of actual adverse effects does not mitigate MIT's burden to justify price fixing with some
procompetitive virtue"). The court in Brown University concluded that three recent Supreme
Court cases support shifting the burden to the defendant to prove a justification for conduct that
appears to be anticompetitive on its face. In Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692-96, the
Court concluded that the adverse effects of an engineering society's ban on competitive bidding
could be presumed because it "'impede[d] the ordinary give and take of the marketplace."' Id. at
692 (quoting United States v. National Society of Professional Engineers, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460
(D.C.D.C. 1975)). The Court ultimately held the rule illegal because the society offered only a
public policy justification (the protection of public safety) and did not demonstrate any valid
economic rationale for the ban. Id. at 692-96. In Indiana Federation of Dentists, the Court held
that the withholding of x-rays from insurance companies was "likely enough to disrupt the
proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market" to justify shifting the burden
to the defendants to justify the restriction. 476 U.S. at 461-62. Similarly, in NCAA the Court
concluded that the television restrictions were a "naked restraint on price and output [which]
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis."
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110. Several antitrust commentators have argued that defendants should
have the burden of proving a justification for inherently suspect conduct. See John J. Flynn,
Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the Chaos, 49
Antitrust L. J. 1593, 1608-19 (1980) (indicating that conduct that displaces the competitive
process should result in a strong presumption of illegality); Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of
Reason, 57 Antitrust L. J. 859, 861-63 (1988) (arguing that, if the conduct is inherently suspect,
the defendant should be required to prove efficiency justifications rather than merely state a
plausible efficiency rationale); Popofsky and Goodwin, 56 Antitrust L. J. at 205 (cited in note 26)
(reading NCAA to impose a burden on the defendant in a "naked restraint" case to prove that
the restraint has procompetitive virtues); Beschle, 38 Hastings L. J. at 476 (cited in note 18)
(suggesting the abandonment of the per se rule in favor of a test for suspect activity that places
a strong burden on the defendant to show procompetitive justifications). The government also
argued for such a shifting of the burden of proof in its amicus brief in Maricopa. See Liebeler,
33 UCLA L. Rev. at 1044-45 (cited in note 57).
109. See, for example, Jorde and Teece, 61 Antitrust L. J. at 602-03 (cited in note 74)
(stating that the marketplace will discipline firms lacking substantial market power that act to
restrain trade); Popofsky and Goodwin, 56 Antitrust L. J. at 203 (indicating that two firms that
agree to a horizontal restraint are unlikely to injure competition if they lack market power).
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tal price fixing, territorial allocations, and group boycotts. First of all,
markets do not always react as quickly as some commentators have
assumed: "For reasons including market inertia and information fail-
ures... a small conspirator may be able to impede competition over
some period of time."11 Furthermore, there is little to be gained and
much to be lost by introducing the complexities of a market power test
into the analysis of such inherently suspect conduct. The courts risk
few mistakes by dispensing with a market power analysis of conduct
which is likely to harm competition in most cases."' On the other
hand, requiring a market power analysis complicates antitrust trials,
wastes judicial resources, and makes plaintiffs more reluctant to
bring cases, thus reducing the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws.
Defendants would not be unduly disadvantaged by bearing the
burden of proving a justification for horizontal price fixing, territorial
allocations, and group boycotts. Indeed, a shifting of the burden of
proof would be a vast improvement over the current per se approach,
which gives defendants no opportunity to show that they had a le-
gitimate purpose for a horizontal restraint."12 Placing the burden of
proof on the defendant is fair since it has access to the documents and
witnesses most probative of the actual competitive effect of an inher-
ently suspect restraint.13 The defendant's internal documents and
testimony from its own employees will usually reveal whether a par-
ticular restraint was intended to enhance the parties' efficiency or
merely to restrict competition. Firms usually can document in ad-
vance their efficiency objectives for particular restraints. A defen-
dant's failure to produce such evidence may indicate that the real
purpose for a restraint was anticompetitive.
110. Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 434-35.
111. See Muris, 57 Antitrust L. J. at 864 (cited in note 108) (arguing that "mistakes should
indeed be few" from foregoing a market power analysis). As Professor Areeda has stated:
Once we decide that a class of practice is in the vast generality of cases detrimental and
unjustified, why bother with the complicated and expensive inquiry into power? We
have certainly learned from merger, monopoly, and rule of reason cases that proving
markets and power is difficult, complex, expensive and time-consuming. The courts
wisely decline to burden the system with such proof when the only thing the defendants
can say for themselves is, "We tried to exploit the public, but failed."
Areeda, 54 Antitrust L. J. at 28 (cited in note 62).
112. See notes 17, 18, and accompanying text.
113. See Dennis A. Yao and Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision
Making and Their Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 Antitrust L. J. 23, 27
(1993) (stating that "[ejfficiency considerations and general principles of law suggest that the
party with access to the relevant information should bear the burden of proving an issue
dependent on that information).
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Horizontal price fixing, territorial allocations, and group boy-
cotts do not always have an anticompetitive purpose. In certain cases
firms may use such restraints to promote their efficiency in the
relevant market. There are enough potentially beneficial uses for
such restraints to justify abandoning the arbitrary per se standard.
The presumption of illegality for these restraints should be rebuttable
rather than conclusive. The defendant should have the opportunity to
show that a price-fixing, territorial allocation, or group boycott ar-
rangement was not naked but was ancillary to a separate endeavor
designed to enhance its efficiency.
The courts easily can determine the legitimacy of horizontal
price fixing, territorial allocations, and group boycotts through an
ancillary restraints analysis. Such an approach would concentrate on
the structure of the restraint at issue. Courts would avoid having to
make complicated inquiries into either market power or the state of
the defendant's mind at the time it implemented a restraint."4 The
restraint would be upheld only if the defendant could prove that it
was no broader than necessary to promote the legitimate purposes of
a separate venture designed to promote its efficiency in the relevant
market.15 A price-fixing arrangement, for example, might be neces-
sary for the effectiveness of an industry-wide venture for the market-
ing of a unique product (such as the copyrighted musical compositions
in Broadcast Music)."6 Similar justifications may exist for territorial
allocations or group boycotts. For example, in order to induce its
competitors to help finance a risky research and development venture
for a new product, a firm may have to agree that each competitor
could market the product in an exclusive territory for a certain period
after it is commercialized. Similarly, the exclusion of certain firms
114. Some courts and commentators have cited the difficulty of determining defendants'
motives as a reason for avoiding a purpose-based approach to Section 1 conduct. See Lomar
Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 594 (8th Cir. 1987)
(refusing to draw a distinction between "dealer-inspired" and "dealer-coerced" restraints); Valley
Liquors, 678 F.2d at 744 (admitting the difficulty of determining the motives of a manufacturer
who terminates a distributor); Peter M. Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for
Intrabrand Restraints: An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 Duke L. J. 417, 439 (stating that "[flocusing
on subjective motive . . . is risky and ineffectual: not only can evidence of purpose be
manipulated, but the evidence is usually ambiguous).
115. The Supreme Court has held in several cases that ancillary restraints can only be
allowed if they are no broader than required to promote the effectiveness of a separate effi-
ciency-enhancing venture. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-15; Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-24;
Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 282-83, affd, 175 U.S. 211 (stating that "if the restraint exceeds
the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void").
116. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-23.
1780 [Vol. 47:1753
SHERMAN ACT
from a joint venture may not have the anticompetitive purpose of a
group boycott but may simply be a means of ensuring that the venture
does not become unwieldy.117
There is some precedent in the Supreme Court for allowing a
defendant to prove the potential beneficial effects of price fixing and
other inherently suspect restraints. This approach, in fact, has a long
history in antitrust law. In 1918, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States,118 the Court sustained a Chicago Board of Trade rule which
froze grain prices during the period the market was closed. The Court
pointed out that the defendants had shown that the rule was neces-
sary for the effectiveness of a public trading market.119 In 1933, in
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,120 the Court upheld an ar-
rangement under which coal producers fixed the price of coal in order
to eliminate "destructive trade practices."121 During the long period in
which the per se rule was predominate, the Court refused to expand
upon these decisions. Indeed, it consistently refused to consider any
of defendants' justifications for horizontal restraints of trade. In a
series of cases beginning in the late 1970s, however, the Court began
to indicate a willingness to modify its traditional per se approach and
again provide defendants an opportunity to explain their rationale for
certain horizontal restrictions on price and output.122
B. Conduct Requiring Market Power Analysis
The economic impact of certain Section 1 restraints is ambigu-
ous enough to require a more detailed balancing of their potential
anticompetitive effects and efficiencies. In certain cases neither the
adverse nor the beneficial aspects of a competitive restriction will be
obvious on its face, and a conduct-based approach such as the ancil-
117. The Supreme Court recognized in Northwest Wholesale, 474 U.S. 284, that, unless a
joint venture possesses "exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition," the
partners should be permitted to limit access to the joint venture in a reasonable manner. 474
U.S. at 296.
118. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
119. Id. at 240-41.
120. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
121. Id. at 359.
122. In Professional Engineers, the Court allowed an association of engineers to defend an
ethical rule prohibiting competitive bidding on public projects. 435 U.S. at 692-96. In Indiana
Federation of Dentists, the Court considered the defendants'justifications for withholding x-rays
from insurance companies. 476 U.S. at 461-62. Similarly, in NCAA, the Court considered the
NCAA's arguments that restrictions on broadcast rights were necessary to insure the
effectiveness of amateur collegiate athletics. 468 U.S. at 113-20.
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lary restraints analysis will be insufficient. In order to confirm such a
restraint's actual effects on competition, a court will have to balance
the parties' market power against their efficiency justifications for the
restraint.
Tying and exclusive dealing arrangements and certain joint
ventures among competitors require such a balancing approach. The
effect of such arrangements upon competition is dependent upon the
parties' market power. The plaintiff should, therefore, bear the initial
burden of proving such market power. Once the plaintiff meets that
burden, the defendant should have the opportunity to rebut by prov-
ing the efficiencies that may result from the arrangement.
The courts can undertake a market power analysis of joint
ventures and tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in a relatively
simple manner. A market share threshold would avoid unnecessary
litigation of cases that pose little threat to competition. Furthermore,
the beneficial effects likely to result from a particular arrangement
can be inferred from objective factors such as the parties' purpose for
the arrangement and the structure of their cooperative endeavor.
1. Tying and Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
Manufacturers can use tying and exclusive dealing arrange-
ments for either benign or pernicious purposes. Such arrangements
can enhance a manufacturer's effectiveness in competing against
other brands; they can also deprive consumers of choice and competi-
tors of access to important markets. Tying arrangements can promote
interbrand competition by assuring the quality of a manufacturer's
product. Certain products can only function properly when used in
conjunction with another product. In such cases a tying arrangement
can insure that consumers do not mix incompatible products. In order
to preserve its reputation for quality and safety, a manufacturer may
have no choice but to require the purchase of the products as a pack-
age. 123
123. The courts have upheld tying arrangements in cases where two products had to be
used in conjunction with one another to insure the proper functioning of either product. See
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-57 (E.D. Pa. 1960), afrd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (approving sale of components of television antenna as single
system in order to assure effective functioning of system); Dehydrating Process Co. v. AO.
Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir. 1961) (approving tie-in of unloading device and silo
on grounds that separate sales had led to widespread customer dissatisfaction); Mozart Co. v.
Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1351 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding require-
ment that automobile dealers purchase replacement parts from automobile manufacturer). But
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Exclusive dealing arrangements also can enhance interbrand
competition. By requiring dealers to purchase products only from it
and not from its competitors, a manufacturer can ensure that the
dealers more aggresively promote its products. Distributors whose
profitability is largely dependent upon sales of a single manufac-
turer's products will be more likely to invest in training, promotion,
and point-of-sale services that will make the products more attractive
to consumers.124
Tying and exclusive dealing arrangements, however, also can
be used to restrict competition in the relevant market. Tying ar-
rangements can force consumers to buy products they would not oth-
erwise have purchased or to pay higher prices than they would in a
competitive market. When a firm is successful in tying the purchase
of one product to another, it can raise costs for its competitors and
increase entry barriers into the tied product market.1 5 By requiring
customers to deal exclusively with it, a supplier can prevent its com-
petitors from accessing potential sales outlets.26 A buyer also can
deprive competitors of a potential source of supply by requiring sup-
pliers to sell solely to it.1 27
Neither competitors nor consumers can be adversely affected
by a tying or exclusive dealing arrangement if the parties to such
arrangements lack market power. Although the courts have ostensi-
bly applied a per se approach to tying arrangements, they have only
found liability in those cases where the firm imposing the tie has
see Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir.
1987) (precluding a requirement essentially identical to that in Mercedes-Benz). If different
products cannot be sold other than as a package (such as a right shoe with a left shoe or an
automobile with tires and a steering wheel), the package should be regarded as a single product,
and therefore no tie would exist in the first place. See Grimes, 62 Antitrust L. J. at 284 (cited in
note 76) (citing a pair of shoes as an example of a product package that is not considered a tie).
124. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Industries, 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating
that an exclusive dealing arrangement may encourage a dealer to promote the manufacturer's
product more vigorously); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. Law & Econ. 1, 3 (1982)
(stating that exclusive dealing can elicit dealer services); Richard M. Steuer, Exclusive Dealing
in Distribution, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 101, 125 (1983) (asserting that exclusive dealing can increase
a distributor's promotional efforts).
125. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962) (holding that the block
booking of films for television raised barriers to entry for potential competitors and was illegal);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L. J. 209, 215-19, 234-48 (1986) (explaining how ties
can raise costs).
126. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 45 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that exclusive
dealing can deprive other suppliers of a market for their goods and other buyers of supply
sources).
127. Id.
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sufficient economic power in the tying product market to force a cus-
tomer to purchase a product it either did not want or would have
preferred to purchase on different terms.12 In the absence of such
market power, a customer will not feel compelled to purchase the tied
product or to pay a supra-competitive price. There can be no anti-
competitive effect when a buyer purchases two products through a
free exercise of choice rather than as a result of the seller's coercion.
Because the customer has not altered its normal buying patterns, the
firm implementing the tie will be unable to raise competitors' costs or
to increase entry barriers in the tied product market.
Exclusive dealing arrangements also have no adverse competi-
tive effects when a manufacturer lacks market power. A firm without
market power will be unable to "lock up" a significant number of sup-
pliers or customers through exclusive dealing arrangements. As a
result, competitors will have access to sufficient remaining outlets to
compete effectively in the relevant market.12 9
Because tying and exclusive dealing arrangements only reduce
competition when a defendant has market power, a plaintiff should be
required to prove such power as a threshold issue. The courts could
prevent unnecessary litigation by establishing a market share thresh-
old for the legality of tying and exclusive dealing. Plaintiffs who fail
to prove market power in excess of the threshold should have their
cases dismissed on summary judgment. The plaintiff could show the
requisite market power for tying arrangements by proving that the
defendant's market share was in excess of thirty percent or that the
128. See Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 (stating that tying arrangements are insignificant
when they do not pressure buyers into taking the tied item); Loew's, 371 U.S. at 52 (stating that
tying arrangements are matters of antitrust concern when they force buyers to purchase the
tied product in lieu of a substitute); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429
U.S. 610, 619 (1977) (holding that a tying agreement must give the seller a market advantage
not shared by competitors in order to raise antitrust concerns). As the Court stated in Jefferson
Parish, 466 U.S. 2: "Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid
tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might
have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms." Id. at 12.
129. The courts have traditionally judged the legality of exclusive dealing arrangements on
the basis of whether they foreclose a significant number of buyer or seller outlets from competi-
tors. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 344 (1961) (holding a require-
ments contract legal in the context of the competitive bituminous coal market); Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357 (1922) (holding that an exclusive
dealing contract between a pattern manufacturer and a merchant substantially lessened com-
petition and thus violated the Clayton Act); Roland Machine, 749 F.2d at 380 [explanatory
paren]; Joyce Beverages of N.Y., Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y 1983)
(holding that an exclusive cola franchise and licensing agreement did not violate the antitrust
laws because it encouraged rather than foreclosed competition).
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tying product was uniquely desirable in some way.3 0 For exclusive
dealing arrangements, the plaintiff should be required to prove that
the defendant possessed more than thirty percent of the relevant
market."'1
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of market
power over the safe harbor threshold, the defendant should have the
opportunity to rebut by proving that it had a procompetitive purpose
for a tying or exclusive dealing arrangement. In the case of tying
arrangements, the courts can avoid the complicated task of weighing
the defendant's efficiency justifications against the plaintiffs proof of
market power. The procompetitive justifications for tying arrange-
ments are limited, but, ofice proven, they should be decisive. A tying
arrangement should be permitted whenever a defendant can demon-
strate that the tie was necessary for the quality or safety of its prod-
ucts. The defense should apply regardless of the defendant's market
power.
In many cases, however, a manufacturer can achieve its qual-
ity objectives by less restrictive means than a tie. The manufacturer
may, for example, be able to list approved suppliers and/or specifica-
tions for items to be used in conjunction with its products. In order to
prevail under a quality control defense, a defendant should first dem-
onstrate that such alternatives are impractical and that a tying ar-
130. "In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product." Fortner, 429 U.S. at 620. In Jefferson Parish,
the Supreme Court stated that the requisite economic power for an illegal tie could be inferred
when the defendant possessed a large market share or the tied product was patented or unique
in a way that could not be matched by competitors. 466 U.S. at 16-17. The Court then went on to
find that a market share of 30% was not sufficient to demonstrate market power. Id. at 26-29.
Since Jefferson Parish, many lower federal courts have used 30% as a market share threshold
for tying arrangements. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797(1st Cir. 1988); M. Leff Radio Parts, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 387, 399 (W.D. Pa. 1988);
Ezpeleta, M.D. v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1262, 1269 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
Under the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), a plaintiff may also be able to prove that it was "locked"
into a tying arrangement by unique market conditions. The Court refused Kodak's motion for
summary judgment on the claim that it had illegally tied the sale of its replacement parts to
repair services for Kodak micrographic equipment. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087-88. The Court
emphasized that the costs to customers of switching from Kodak's equipment was high and that,
once the equipment was purchased, buyers could be locked into obtaining spare parts and
services from Kodak. Id. at 2087.
131. The concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish applied a 30% market share threshold to
exclusive dealing arrangements. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 46 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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rangement is the only feasible means of insuring the quality or safety
of its products.5 2
The courts will have to undertake a more detailed balancing
analysis for exclusive dealing arrangements. Such arrangements are
capable both of promoting and restricting interbrand competition.
Exclusive dealing can enhance such competition by encouraging dis-
tributors to promote a manufacturer's products more aggressively, but
it can also restrict interbrand competition by denying other manufac-
turers access to the distributors covered by the exclusive deal. It is
therefore insufficient for a defendant merely to show that it had a pro-
competitive purpose for an exclusive dealing arrangement. The courts
must balance such a purpose against the potential foreclosure of out-
lets resulting from the arrangement. The greater the manufacturer's
market share, the more difficult it would be for it to prevail under a
balancing analysis. A manufacturer with a large market share has
the ability to foreclose a greater number of distribution outlets from
its competitors. Moreover, such a manufacturer also would have less
need to use an exclusive dealing arrangement to enhance its effec-
tiveness in the interbrand market.
2. Joint Ventures
The courts have applied three conflicting types of analysis to
joint ventures: a merger-based approach which concentrates on the
parties' market power, a per se analysis that deems certain joint ven-
tures illegal on their face, and a rule of reason approach that consid-
ers all possible anticompetitive effects and potential efficiencies of a
particular arrangement. 33 These conflicting approaches have con-
132. Several courts have required defendants to prove that less restrictive alternatives to
tying arrangements (such as the specification of substitutes) would be impractical. See
Standard Oil Co. of CA. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (stating that the protection
of good will necessitates the use of a tying clause only when it would be impracticable to de-
scribe specifications for substitute products); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th
Cir. 1971) (stating that tying agreements can by justified only in the absence of less restrictive
alternatives); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 514-15, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that
the defendant had the burden of showing that a tying agreement is reasonably necessary to
promote its trademark); Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.12 (9th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the specification alternative is not available when a tied product is
manufactured pursuant to a secret formula). See also Grimes, 62 Antitrust L. J. at 285-86 (cited
in note 76) (concluding that the seller should carry the burden of showing that less anticompeti-
tive measures than a tie would not be workable).
133. For a merger-based approach, see United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S.
158, 175-76 (1964) (analyzing the loss of potential competition among joint venture partners).
For a per se analysis, see Timkin Roller Bearing, 341 U.S. at 598 (holding that agreements
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fused American businesses and deterred them from entering into
cooperative arrangements with their competitors that could enhance
their efficiency in the global marketplace.34
These inconsistent standards are a result of the courts' inabil-
ity to agree on the type of conduct that should be classified as a joint
venture. The courts have applied the joint venture label to conduct
"in an infinite variety of structures and durations and forms and
scopes."135 Such conduct has ranged from mere agreements among
competitors to coordinate their activities to arrangements that are as
integrated as mergers.
A court's first step in analyzing a cooperative arrangement
among competitors should be to examine its structure to determine
whether a joint venture analysis is appropriate. If the parties have
fully integrated their operations, the court should analyze the ar-
rangement in the same manner as a merger. Unintegrated horizontal
agreements, on the other hand, should be treated as naked restraints
of trade. True joint ventures fall between these two extremes. While
they are not as fully integrated as mergers, they do involve some
combination of the parties' resources beyond a simple coordination of
parallel activities. Such arrangements thus should be analyzed in a
different manner than either mergers or naked restraints.
A merger analysis is appropriate when the parties have inte-
grated all of their existing production or marketing operations in a
joint venture. Such integrations eliminate all competition between
the parties in the relevant market. As in a merger, a single entity
(the joint venture) takes the place of the former competitors in the
between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competition among themselves and
others cannot be justified by labeling the project a 'joint venture"); Sealy, 388 U.S. at 355
(stating that the anticompetitive nature of price fixing is so apparent that the Court will deem it
illegal without applying the rule of reason); and Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 (holding that a
horizontal territorial allocation among an association of grocery store owners is illegal per se).
For a rule of reason approach, see Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 24 (applying the rule of reason
to the issuance of blanket licenses by an association of musical composers); Northwest
Wholesale, 472 U.S. at 296 (analyzing an expulsion from a wholesale purchasing cooperative
under the rule of reason); and NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01 (stating that horizontal restraints are
analyzed under the rule of reason if they are necessary to make the product of a cooperative
venture available to consumers).
134. See Jorde and Teece, 4 High Tech. L. J. at 36 (cited in note 67) (stating that the ambi-
guity of rule of reason analysis needlessly inhibits strategic alliances).
135. J. Paul McGrath, Antitrust Problems in Negotiating a Joint Venture Agreement, 54
Antitrust L. J. 971, 973 (1985). As one commentator has stated, "[a] joint venture could involve
any business enterprise in which two or more persons collaborate to achieve some commercial
goal-a definition that includes all of antitrust except, perhaps, some single firm attempts to
monopolize...." Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 74
Georgetown L. J. 1605, 1605 (1986).
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market. These arrangements have the same economic impact as an
acquisition of one partner's business by the other, and thus they
should be analyzed in the same manner.136 Like mergers, complete
integrations effected through joint ventures should be analyzed under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act to determine whether their effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition" in any relevant market.3 7 The
guidelines adopted by the Department of Justice for mergers, which
consider such factors as the parties' market shares, changes in indus-
try concentration levels resulting from a merger, ease of entry into the
relevant market, and the efficiencies likely to result from a merger,
are also appropriate for fully integrated joint ventures. 38
An ancillary restraints approach should be used, however, to
analyze a venture that amounts to no more than a coordination of
136. A recent alliance between a domestic and a foreign airline provides a good example of
such a fully integrated arrangement. In 1992, Northwest Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines asked the Department of Transportation to approve an agreement under which they
would operate, in effect, as a single airline. See Agis Salpukas, Plan Set in Northwest KLM
Link, N.Y. Times at D1 (Sept. 10, 1992). The two airlines agreed to coordinate pricing, combine
their sales forces, share information on seat availability, and share revenue. Id. They even
stated that they might fly under the same name. Id. at D17. When competitors join their
production and marketing operations in such a complete manner, courts should analyze the
arrangement as a merger.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Although mergers are usually analyzed under § 7 of the
Clayton Act, they also may be challenged as unreasonable restraints of trade under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. The courts have held that the competitive analysis should be similar under
either statute. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665, 671-72 (1964)
(holding that the elimination of competition by merger or consolidation violates § 1 of the
Sherman Act); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 893 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that judicial interpretations of violations of § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the
Sherman Act have converged); McCaw Personal Communications v. Pacific Telesis Group, 645
F. Supp. 1166, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (stating that the standard by which mergers and
acquisitions are judged under the Sherman Act is similar, if not identical, to the Clayton Act
standard). Many courts have applied merger analysis to joint ventures that eliminate all
commercial rivalry between their partners. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969), the combination of two newspapers' advertising and circulation functions precluded
future competition. Id. at 134. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that if the
operating agreement between the two papers had provided that it would continue indefinitely
"we would have had no choice but to treat the transaction in the same way we would treat a
total corporate merger." Id. at 141 (Harlan, J., concurring). In United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), competition was eliminated by a joint committee's pooling of
the profits of formerly competitive movie theaters. Id. at 149. In United States v. Ivaco, Inc.,
704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989), the district court applied a merger analysis to a joint
venture to which two manufacturers contributed their entire railroad track equipment business.
Id. at 1414-30. The court distinguished its analysis from the more permissive approach that
would have been appropriate if the companies merely had entered into a limited venture for
research and development that left them free to compete in other areas of the railroad track
equipment business. Id. at 1426.
138. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines-1992, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 at Sec. 1,
Sec. 3, Sec. 4 (April 2, 1992).
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competitors' parallel efforts. Such an arrangement is incapable of
producing efficiencies because the partners have not shared any re-
sources or risks. The mere coordination of parallel activity without
any corresponding integration amounts to no more than a naked re-
straint of trade. For example, agreements by buyers on the prices
they will pay, without any integration of purchasing operations that
will reduce the buyers' costs, create no cognizable efficiencies.
Similarly, producers may organize for the simple purpose of resisting
buyers' demands for discounts or other cost reduction measures.
Because such arrangements are not ancillary to any productive inte-
gration, their predominate effect will be anticompetitive. Such con-
duct should be classified at the presumptively illegal end of the Sec-
tion 1 continuum and analyzed in the same manner as horizontal
price fixing.
Most modern joint ventures are neither naked attempts by
competitors to coordinate parallel conduct nor complete integrations
of their existing operations. During the last decade, American firms
have begun to form partially integrated strategic alliances with their
competitors at an unprecedented rate.139 Rather than integrating all
of their partners' operations, these alliances combine only a small por-
tion of each partner's total resources. The alliances usually are
formed for a limited purpose (such as research and development of a
new product) and are designed to last only long enough to accomplish
such purpose. Because the parties to such ventures share certain
resources and risks, these arrangements cannot be analyzed as naked
restraints; at the same time, because the parties do not completely
integrate their operations, the ventures cannot be treated like merg-
ers.
Because of their unique competitive characteristics, such par-
tially integrated arrangements should qualify for a special analysis.
A balancing approach is appropriate for modern strategic alliances.
Because such alliances are capable of producing both anticompetitive
effects and efficiencies, the courts should consider both aspects of a
joint venture before determining its legality. The antitrust analysis of
such arrangements, however, can be carried out rather simply. In
many cases the procompetitive effects of such arrangements will be
139. Indeed, the number of new strategic alliances in the United States has nearly doubled
in each of the last ten years. Jeremy Main, Making Global Alliances Work, Fortune at 121, 126
(Dec. 17, 1990). One author has described strategic alliances as "the competitive weapon of the
1990's." Jordan D. Lewis, Competitive Alliances Redefine Companies, 80 Mgmt. Rev. 14, 14
(April 1991).
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outwardly evident, and the outcome of the balancing approach will be
obvious.
Joint ventures should be upheld on their face when they enable
firms to develop new products or enter new markets that would have
been beyond their individual capabilities. A joint venture may pro-
vide a vehicle for firms to share technology, capital, or certain unique
assets necessary for the production or development of a new product.
IBM and Apple, for example, recently entered into a joint venture that
will permit them to develop a new computer operating system that
combines the best characteristics of each company's software.140
Boeing and several European firms have pooled their capital re-
sources for the $10 billion development of a new jumbo jet that none
of the firms could have afforded to produce on its own. 41 Several
pharmaceutical companies joined forces to share the patents required
to produce a "multi-valent" childhood vaccine that would be effective
against several diseases at once. 42 Such ventures are procompetitive
because they permit "the introduction of a new competitor that oth-
erwise might never have come into being."'' 3 Such ventures also have
no anticompetitive effects. No commercial rivalry is eliminated by the
formation of a joint venture in a market in which the partners do not
currently compete or, absent the joint venture, could not have
competed. The only competitive effects of such ventures are benefi-
cial. Therefore, plaintiffs will be unable to make out a prima facie
140. See Evelyn Richards, IBM, Apple Plan Cooperation, Washington Post at Ai (July 4,
1991).
141. Jeff Cole and Brian Coleman, Boeing, Four Members of Airbus to Study Jointly
Developing Jet, Wall Street Journal at A10 (Jan. 28, 1993).
142. See Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures, Allocative
Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 Antitrust L. J., 937, 940 n.18 (1993) (citing
Request for Commission Approval of Proposed Joint Venture Between Pasteur Merieux Serums
et Vaccins and Merck & Co., Inc. 2-6 (Federal Trade Commission, filed Oct. 10, 1991)).
143. Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1007, 1018-19 (1969). A recent marketing joint
venture among 170 distributors of electrical equipment is another example of a joint venture
that brings a new competitor into a market. The dealers formed the joint venture for the
purpose of competing for "national accounts" with large industrial customers who have several
plants in various parts of the country. None of the members of the joint venture had operations
in enough locations to bid on the national accounts. The Department of Justice approved the
joint venture because it allowed these firms to compete for business from which they would
otherwise have been foreclosed. See Letter from James T. Rill, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Charles F. Rule, Esq. (May 5, 1992) (on file
with the Author) (stating that the Department of Justice "has no current intention to challenge
the implementation of the proposed program" because, among other things it enabled 'members
to compete for national accounts they could not otherwise serve").
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case of their illegality, and the courts will be free to dispose of such
cases on summary judgment.
More serious antitrust issues are raised by joint ventures that
combine competitors' existing operations at a particular stage of the
product cycle. Although not as fully integrated as mergers, such ar-
rangements do eliminate competition at the relevant production
stage. If, for example, several firms combine their ongoing research
and development efforts for a particular product, they may forego
"promising independent approaches" to new technology. 144 Such ven-
tures "conceivably could substitute a large and leisurely project for a
number of smaller, more energetic ones.' 145 When competitors com-
bine existing production facilities, total output in the market may be
reduced. At the marketing stage, joint ventures among competitors
can have a significant adverse effect. Such ventures increase the
market power of the participants and present an opportunity for
collusion on pricing by giving each partner access to the others' cost,
pricing, and marketing information.
A market power analysis is appropriate for joint ventures that
integrate competitors' current operations at any stage of the produc-
tion cycle. The adverse competitive effects of such arrangements are
dependent upon the parties' market power. Substantial reductions in
research and development, production output, or price competition
will only occur when the joint venture partners collectively can
exercise market power. Thus, as part of its prima facie case, the
plaintiff should be required to prove that the partners to joint
ventures in existing markets have a market share above a particular
threshold. Because "[t]he potential for price-fixing and market
domination grows as a company moves closer to the marketplace,"146
the market share threshold should be higher for "upstream" than for
"downstream" joint ventures. Upstream joint ventures limited to
research and development, industry standards setting, joint buying,
or other "inputs" into the production process usually do not affect the
partners' decisions on pricing and output.147 Thus a relatively high
144. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements
Involving Government Contractors, 58 Antitrust L. J. 1059, 1095 (1990).
145. William J. Murphy, Interfirm Cooperation in a Competitive Economic System, 26 Am.
Bus. L. J. 29, 46 (1988).
146. Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Production Joint Ventures, 30 Jurimetrics 253, 263
(1990).
147. See Walter J. Winslow, Joint Ventures-Antitrust Problems and Opportunities, 54
Antitrust L. J. 979, 983-84 (1985); Pitofsky, 82 Harv. L. Rev. at 1040 (cited in note 143).
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market share threshold of thirty-five to forty percent would be
appropriate for such ventures. Downstream production and
marketing joint ventures, however, have a greater potential for
anticompetitive effects. A market share threshold of twenty to
twenty-five percent should apply to such ventures. 148
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of market power, a
defendant should be allowed to rebut by showing circumstances that
mitigate a joint venture's adverse effect on competition. Even if the
parties have a large collective market share, the joint venture will not
have a significant adverse effect if it is of limited scope and duration.
If a joint venture has a limited term, the parties will be acutely aware
that their self interest lies in maintaining their individual competitive
capacities. If the venture covers only an upstream phase of the pro-
duction cycle, the parties will retain their incentive to compete in the
production and marketing phases. The "Big Three" automobile com-
panies, for example, have entered into several research and develop-
ment consortia for such products as an electric car, pollution control
equipment, safety devices, and lightweight materials to replace steel
in automobiles. 149 These consortia have not prevented Ford, General
Motors, and Chrysler from competing just as fiercely against each
other in the production and sale of automobiles.
A defendant also can rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
proving that the efficiencies of a joint venture are likely to outweigh
its anticompetitive effects. Traditionally, the courts have given little
weight to efficiency defenses in merger and joint venture analysis,
believing that such arguments are easy to assert but difficult to con-
firm. 150 The courts should have no trouble, however, distinguishing
148. In the vertical restraints area, the courts "appear to be converging on a definition of
safe harbor for firms possessing less than a 20-25% market share in a relevant market." Jorde
and Teece, 4 High Tech. L. J. at 45 (cited in note 67). See note 60 for the cases defining a
market share safe harbor for vertical restraints. The Department of Justice has defimed a safe
harbor for mergers in cases where the post-merger "concentration ratio" is less than 1000 on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. This ratio corresponds to approximately a 50% market share for
the four largest firms in the relevant market. See Merger Guidelines-1984, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep.(CCH) 13,103 at 20,552-53 ("DOJ Merger Guidelines"). In light of the unique competitive
advantages of joint ventures, the market share safe harbor for these arrangements should be
higher than for vertical restraints or for mergers.
149. See Oscar Survis, Big Three Win Joint Patent, Marking a First, Wall Street Journal
B1 (April 13, 1993); Christopher Jensen, Big 3 Work Together on Research, Cleveland Plain
Dealer El (Feb. 28, 1993).
150. See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration, 62 Antitrust L. J.
217, 221 (1993). See also Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 Antitrust L. J.
513, 514 (1994) (stating that "[t]he problem of proof is the principal reason why, in an antitrust
era that has been quite hospitable to efficiencies claims in a wide variety of other contexts,
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genuine from sham efficiency arguments. First of all, the defendant,
who will have access to the relevant documents and witnesses, will
have the burden of proving a legitimate efficiency justification.
Furthermore, the efficiencies likely to result from a particular joint
venture often will be evident from the degree to which the venture
integrates the parties' resources. As one commentator has pointed
out, "the assumption that higher levels of integration are likely to be
associated with more substantial efficiencies.., is a premise underly-
ing all of antitrust.... -151
The amount of integration present in a joint venture is an ob-
jective standard from which the courts should easily be able to infer
the most probable efficiencies of the venture. If the partners contrib-
ute substantial technology, assets, or capital and share the risks of a
joint venture's success or failure, they are likely to create a new com-
petitive entity with capacities beyond those of the individual partners.
Research and development ventures, for example, are more likely to
achieve technical advances when the partners are willing to share
freely with the venture all of their relevant proprietary know-how.
Production joint ventures are most efficient when the partners invest
significant amounts of their own capital to improve the production
process. Marketing joint ventures benefit consumers if the partners
combine their sales networks to enhance point-of-sale services.
Conversely, when partners contribute little to joint ventures, they are
more likely acting for their own competitive benefit rather than to
enhance general economic efficiency. An agreement by purchasers to
pool their bargaining power or a joint marketing agreement among
competing sellers, unaccompanied by any other efforts at integration,
efficiencies have yet to play an outcome-determinative role in any litigated merger case"). The
merger cases in which courts have declined to consider efficiency defenses include United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963); RSR Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317, 1325(9th Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 936
(9th Cir. 1975). The DOJ Merger Guidelines, which do not give efficiencies a high status in
merger analysis, provide: "[Efficiencies do not constitute a defense to an otherwise
anticompetitive merger but are one of many factors that will be considered by the Department
in determining whether to challenge a merger." See DOJ Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,103 at 20,554 (cited in note 148). Some commentators believe, however, that thejudicial attitude toward efficiency defenses is undergoing a change and that such defenses will
have a higher status in the future. Professor Pitofsky believes that after World War II
Americans assumed that "our efficiency was so vastly superior to other parts of the world that...
incentives to increase efficiency were not necessary."' Bingaman Stresses Role of Antitrust in
Markets with Evolving Technologies, [January-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1646, 3, 5 (Jan. 13, 1994). Since this assumption is no longer widely held, Pitofsky foresees a
greater receptivity toward efficiency arguments, beginning in the lower courts. Id.
151. Pitofsky, 74 Georgetown L. J. at 1623 (cited in note 135).
19941 1793
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
may very well enhance the profitability of individual partners. These
arrangements, however, will do little to create substantial overall
efficiencies in the relevant market.
Substantially integrated joint ventures of limited scope and
duration should easily pass muster under the balancing test. Such
arrangements generate significant efficiencies and have minimal anti-
competitive effects even when the parties have large market shares.
The FTC's analysis of a recent joint venture between Toyota and
General Motors is instructive. The joint venture involved the produc-
tion of a compact car at a plant in Fremont, California.152 The FTC
recognized that such a downstream venture between the first and
third largest automobile manufacturers in the world could have an
adverse effect on competition.153 However, the FTC also pointed out
that such effects would be limited because the venture only covered
the production of a single automobile, and the parties were free to
continue to compete in the marketing phase. 54 Furthermore, any
adverse competitive effects would be outweighed by the efficiencies
that could result from the parties' integration of their production
capacity. 55 The FTC emphasized in particular that General Motors
would have the opportunity to learn more efficient Japanese manufac-
turing techniques. 55
Once a court has determined the legality of a joint venture it-
self, it may be called upon to determine the legality of related re-
straints on competition among the parties to the venture. Such re-
strictions can be analyzed under the ancillary restraints doctrine
described in Part VI.A above. Most joint ventures, for example,
include certain restrictions on membership. If such restrictions are
necessary for the effective operation of the venture, they can be
upheld as ancillary restraints. If, however, the membership
restrictions are broader than necessary (arbitrarily precluding, for
example, competitors' access to an essential facility or asset), they
should be deemed illegal as a naked group boycott. 5 7  Territorial
152. In the Matter of General Motors Corporation, 103 F.T.C. 374, 378, 386 (1984).
153. Id. at 386-87.
154. Id. at 386.
155. See id.
156. Id. at 387-88. This assumption has been borne out by later events, for General Motors
has assigned alumni of the joint venture to oversee changes in manufacturing techniques at
many of its plants. See Paul Ingrassia and Joseph B. White, Major Overhaul: Determined to
Change, General Motors is Said to Pick New Chairman, Wall Street Journal Al, A4 (Oct. 23,
1992).
157. See note 106 and accompanying text.
1794 [Vol. 47:1753
SHERMAN ACT
grants made to the members of a joint venture can be analyzed in a
similar manner. If, for example, a research and development venture
is particularly risky, its partners may only be able to induce
investments from other firms by promising them the exclusive right to
market the technology developed by the venture in a particular
territory. In such a case the territorial grants should be upheld as
ancillary restraints rather than being deemed illegal as naked
territorial allocations among competitors.158
C. Presumptively Legal Restraints
With the category of vertical restraints, the continuum of Sec-
tion 1 analysis comes full circle. Like inherently suspect conduct at
the beginning of the continuum, vertical restraints at the continuum's
end can be judged under the ancillary restraints doctrine. Vertical
restraints imposed independently by a manufacturer are ancillary to
the integration between the manufacturer and its distribution net-
work. Such restraints should be afforded a presumption of legality
because they promote the manufacturer's competitiveness in the
interbrand market. If, however, a manufacturer imposes a restraint
simply as a concession to its distributors, the restraint is not ancillary
to the manufacturer's distribution network. Rather, such horizontal
restraints constitute a naked restriction of intrabrand competition.
Thus a distributor adversely affected by such a restraint should be
permitted to rebut the presumption of legality by proving that the
restraint was imposed horizontally by other distributors rather than
vertically by the manufacturer.
The relationship between a manufacturer and its distributors
constitutes a type of partnership designed to insure the effectiveness
of the manufacturer's distribution system. In order to maintain the
efficiency of that system, a manufacturer may impose many different
requirements on its distributors. Distributors may have to agree to
hire a particular number of salespeople, maintain a sales office,
attend sufficient training programs to become familiar with the
manufacturer's products, or meet an annual sales quota. Such
requirements do not raise antitrust issues because their only effect is
to enhance the distributors' effectiveness in promoting the
manufacturer's products. Other requirements, however, are suspect
from an antitrust standpoint. Requirements that distributors sell
158. See notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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only from a particular location or to specified customers or territories,
for example, limit distributors' rights to compete freely in the resale of
the manufacturer's products.
The Supreme Court pointed out in GTE Sylvania that such
vertical restraints can have beneficial as well as adverse competitive
effects. 1 9 Although territorial and customer restraints limit intra-
brand competition among dealers, they also can promote interbrand
competition by encouraging the dealers to provide point-of-sale serv-
ices that make a manufacturer's products more attractive to consum-
ers.160 Indeed, it is by virtue of their restriction of intrabrand compe-
tition that such restraints enhance interbrand competition. Freedom
from intrabrand competition helps assure distributors that they will
have a sufficient resale margin to afford point-of-sale services. 61 The
Court concluded in GTE Sylvania that the rule of reason should be
used to balance such beneficial interbrand effects against any reduc-
tion of intrabrand competition resulting from a vertical restraint. 62
Since the GTE Sylvania decision, most courts have concluded
that the beneficial effects of nonprice vertical restraints outweigh
their adverse effect on intrabrand competition.163 Still, many uncer-
tainties remain in the courts' analysis of vertical restraints. The
courts have never explained how a judge or jury should balance the
adverse intrabrand effects of a vertical restraint against its beneficial
impact on interbrand competition. Indeed, it is impossible for a court
to conduct such a balancing test in any effective manner. Interbrand
and intrabrand competition have completely different characteristics.
Interbrand competition encompasses the entire phase of the produc-
tion process from research and development through the final sale of
a product. It includes all firms capable of producing a particular type
of product. Intrabrand competition, on the other hand, is much nar-
rower in scope. It is limited to the resale phase of a single manufac-
turer's product. Intrabrand competition is, in fact, entirely the crea-
tion of a single manufacturer. If it wishes, a manufacturer can, with-
out violating the antitrust laws, eliminate all intrabrand competition
simply by electing to sell products directly to consumers instead of
through dealers.
159. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57.
160. Id. at 54-55.
161. Id. at 55.
162. Id. at 59.
163. See note 50 and accompanying text
1796 [Vol. 47:1753
SHERMAN ACT
Because interbrand competition is more important than intra-
brand competition, it is not surprising that the courts have required
distributors to prove an adverse effect in the interbrand market in
order to prevail in a vertical restraint case. Terminated distributors
have had their cases dismissed when they have been unable to prove
a manufacturer's interbrand market power. 164 However, by concen-
trating exclusively on interbrand competition, the courts have over-
looked the advantages of intrabrand competition. Although intra-
brand competition is not the primary concern of antitrust law, it can
provide important benefits to consumers. Free competition among
distributors reduces resale prices and encourages marketing innova-
tions and more efficient forms of retailing. Such competition also
stimulates a greater output of services and adds to the variety and
range of choices available to consumers.165  Because intrabrand
competition can be beneficial to consumers, its restriction should only
be tolerated when there is a compensating benefit in the interbrand
market.
Whenever a manufacturer acts independently to impose a
vertical restraint, a court can be assured that it is attempting to en-
hance its interbrand efficiency. In such cases the interbrand benefit
of the restraint clearly outweighs any restriction of intrabrand compe-
tition. A manufacturer may, however, impose a restraint on its deal-
ers simply to placate a rival dealer attempting to avoid intrabrand
competition. A large distributor may, for example, be able to induce a
manufacturer to terminate a smaller rival or to prevent it from selling
to customers or territories served by the larger distributor. Such an
unjustified restriction of intrabrand competition should be illegal
regardless of the manufacturer's share of the interbrand market.
Such conduct has nothing to do with promoting the manufacturer's
efficiency in the interbrand market. When a manufacturer acquiesces
to a distributor's anticompetitive demands and imposes a restraint on
a rival distributor, the restraint's source becomes horizontal rather
than vertical. Such a restriction has no beneficial purpose, for, unlike
164. In Robinson-Bock Distributing Co., Inc. v. Pioneer/Eclipse Corp., 285 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) at 2-4 (Oct. 19, 1993) (7th Cir. 1993), for example, the court held that a terminated
janitorial supply store could not prevail in a rule of reason case because the manufacturer held
only four percent of the 'janitorial supply industry as a whole." See also The Jeanery, Inc. v.
James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986); McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair
Co., 798 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1986).
165. Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Sharp that "fostering intrabrand competition
has been recognized as an important goal of antitrust law." Sharp, 485 U.S. at 749 n.14
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a manufacturer, a dealer is not motivated to enhance interbrand
competition and is usually driven by a desire to restrict intrabrand
competition as much as possible in order to protect its profit mar-
gins.
66
By requiring proof of a manufacturer's interbrand market
power, the lower federal courts have unduly limited dealers' remedies
for horizontally induced restraints. In many cases a dealer will be
unable to show that a manufacturer had a sufficient share of the in-
terbrand market to raise an inference of anticompetitive effects. Thus
dealers could have their cases dismissed on summary judgment even
when they were denied access to a market by one of their competitors.
Given the expense and uncertainties of a market power case, dealers
may be reluctant to initiate lawsuits even against manufacturers with
a substantial share of the interbrand market.
There is precedent, however, for an approach that would rec-
ognize the pernicious effects of horizontally induced restraints in the
intrabrand market. The Supreme Court held in a recent case that an
adverse impact on intrabrand competition alone was sufficient to
prove the illegality of a vertical restraint. In Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services,167 the Court considered whether Kodak had
illegally tied the purchase of its replacement parts to the purchase of
repair services for Kodak micrographic equipment. Kodak had
adopted a policy under which it would only sell replacement parts to
purchasers who would also agree to have Kodak repair the equip-
ment. The Court concluded that the intrabrand market for Kodak
replacement parts was the relevant market for determining whether
Kodak had sufficient economic power to coerce equipment owners into
purchasing both replacement parts and repair services. 168
An ancillary restraints approach would, as required by Kodak,
recognize the intrabrand as well as interbrand market effects of verti-
cal restraints. Any restraints imposed independently by a manufac-
turer would be upheld as ancillary to the partnership among a manu-
facturer and its dealers to enhance efficiency in the interbrand mar-
ket. Even manufacturers with large market shares would not be
166. One dissenting opinion has recognized that, when a manufacturer acts at a dealer's
behest in implementing a vertical restraint, "the harm to intrabrand competition. . . is both
immediate and apparent, with no countervailing stimulation of interbrand competition, the
usual saving grace of a vertical restraint." Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 141 (2d
Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
167. 112 S. Ct. 2072.
168. Id. at 2080.
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precluded from implementing restrictions designed to make their
distribution systems more efficient. 6 9
An ancillary restraints analysis, however, also would preclude
distributors from coercing manufacturers into imposing undue limits
on intrabrand competition. In such a case the distributor is not acting
as a partner with the manufacturer in the interbrand market.
Instead, it is promoting its own interest as an independent entrepre-
neur by avoiding intrabrand competition from a rival.17 The vertical
restraint is therefore unrelated to any legitimate integration. The
imposition of vertical restraints as a result of the inducement of com-
peting dealers constitutes a type of naked restraint whose only effect
is to limit intrabrand competition. The manufacturer's participation
may lend a superficial vertical appearance to the scheme, but such
conduct is just as harmful to competition as the horizontal price
fing, territorial allocations, and group boycotts at the presumptively
illegal end of the Section I continuum.
Distributor cartels, however, are relatively rare.171 In most
cases a manufacturer will be acting independently to promote its
interbrand efficiency when it imposes a vertical restraint. It is there-
fore appropriate to presume the legality of vertical restraints and put
a heavy burden on the plaintiff to prove that a restraint was actually
169. Under the current judicial approach, manufacturers with a significant market share
are at some risk of antitrust liability when they implement vertical restraints. Some courts
have adopted a market share threshold of 20-25% for vertical restraints. See notes 60, 148 and
accompanying text. The threshold does not, however, protect suppliers with larger market
shares.
170. As Professor Areeda has stated:
From the policy viewpoint, it can matter greatly whether manufacturer or dealer
interests are being served. The former is more likely to seek efficient distribution,
which stimulates interbrand competition; the latter is more likely to seek excess profits,
which dampen interbrand competition. Accordingly, antitrust policy can be more
hospitable toward manufacturer efforts to control dealer prices, customers, or territories
than toward the efforts of dealers to control their competitors through the manufacturer.
Philip A. Areeda, 7 Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Applications §
1457 at 167-68 (Little Brown, 1986). See also Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196, 200
(9th Cir. 1963) (stating that "it is normally the competitor who is being hurt by pricecutting who
is likely to seek coercive action against the competitor who is hurting or likely to hurt him");
Arnold Pontiac-GMC v. General Motors Corp., 700 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (stating
that "A horizontal agreement by dealers ... is only motivated by the dealers [sic] desire to
eliminate intrabrand competition within the region and thereby to maximize profits. Such
agreements have no procompetitive motivation, and are consistently found illegal per se").
171. See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 727 n.2 (stating that retail market power is rare because of the
presence of interbrand competition and other dealers (citing GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54)).
See also Red Diamond Supply v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that divergent interests of a manufacturer and its distributors keep manufacturers
from becoming parties to distributor-created conspiracies).
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imposed horizontally by other distributors. Indeed, the plaintiff
should be required to prove that, but for the inducement of a rival
distributor, the manufacturer would not have implemented a vertical
restraint.172 Under such a standard, the plaintiff would need to dem-
onstrate that the anticompetitive demands of competing distributors
were the proximate cause of the imposition of a vertical restraint.
Such an approach would protect manufacturers against undue liabil-
ity for implementing legitimate vertical restrictions.' 73
An ancillary restraints approach would resolve another serious
deficiency in the courts' current approach to vertical restraints: the
artificial distinction between price and non-price restraints. The
price/non-price dichotomy originated in GTE Sylvania, where the
Supreme Court abandoned its ten-year-old rule on the per se illegality
of non-price vertical restraints.174 The Court, however, was unwilling
to forego its sixty-six-year-old precedent applying the per se rule to
resale price maintenance. 75 There is no economic basis for the dis-
tinction made in GTE Sylvania. Restrictions on resale prices have
the same economic effect as the customer and location clauses to
which the Court applied the rule of reason. Like non-price vertical re-
straints, resale price maintenance can be used by a manufacturer to
encourage distributors to more aggressively promote its products.
Resale price restraints are simply another way of protecting dealers
from the type of intrabrand competition that discourages them from
providing point-of-sale services. Both price and non-price restraints
172. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among
A Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 Cornell L. Rev.
297, 310-11 (1982) (explaining that group boycotts are sometimes induced by a single firm at one
competitive level that uses its economic power to induce a horizontal plurality of firms at
another competitive level).
173. The Court in Monsanto concluded that it would be unfair to infer the existence of a
resale price-fixing conspiracy from a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting dealer
following complaints from other distributors. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. The Court pointed out
that manufacturers need to receive feedback from distributors on the efficiency of their distri-
bution system: Inferring a conspiracy merely from the receipt of complaints would deter
beneficial communications between a manufacturer and its dealers. Id. A "but for" standard
should eliminate any concerns about such adverse effects. Under such an approach, courts
would be forced to consider how a manufacturer would have acted in the absence of the com-
plaints. A distributor would have to prove that another distributor's complaints were the
determinative factor in the implementation of a vertical restraint. If the supplier would have
implemented a vertical restriction in any event to enhance the efficiency of its distribution
system, the supplier could not be held liable. See Piraino, 67 Cornell L. Rev. at 311.
174. 433 U.S. at 57.
175. The Court first applied the per se rule to resale price maintenance in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911). The Court expressly retained
the per se rule for resale price fixing in GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
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limit intrabrand competition, raise distributors' resale margins, and
thereby encourage them to invest more heavily in the promotion of a
manufacturer's products. Resale price maintenance, in fact, is less
restrictive of intrabrand competition than are territorial restrictions.
Territorial restrictions preclude all competition among dealers for
certain customers or in particular territories; resale price restraints,
on the other hand, allow dealers to continue to compete in quality,
service, and other non-price areas.176
If the courts truly want to follow an economics-based approach
to antitrust policy, they should eliminate the distinction between
price and non-price vertical restraints. The current approach has the
perverse effect of discouraging manufacturers from adopting the least
restrictive means of assuring efficiency in their distribution systems.
Courts treat internal growth or vertical mergers by manufacturers
into the resale level leniently under the antitrust laws.177 Contract
integrations achieved through resale price restrictions should receive
at least as much deference. 78 Such restraints are preferable to verti-
cal integration, for they can achieve the productive purposes of such
integration without eliminating all intrabrand competition.
Manufacturers have no interest in hurting themselves by limiting
intrabrand competition in a manner that will give their distributors a
larger resale margin than necessary to encourage the optimum level
of customer services. Why would a manufacturer want to risk raising
resale prices above the level that assures the sale of the maximum
amount of its products? If the manufacturer errs and adopts overly
restrictive resale price restraints, the manufacturer will lose market
share to competing brands and should ultimately be forced to revise
the restraints. 79 As long as a manufacturer acts independently of its
176. One commentator has stated that "The territorial restriction affects both price and
service competition; the price restriction affects only price competition." Richard A. Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 6, 9 (1981). See also Panel Discussion, Antitrust Dos and Don'ts of Distribution, 53
Antitrust L. J. 363, 377-78 (1984) (comments of Harry H. Reasoner) (stating that territorial
restrictions are arguably more restrictive of intrabrand competition than resale price
maintenance). In Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wild Heerbrugg Instruments, 572 F.2d 883, 885-86
(1st Cir. 1978), the First Circuit held that a manufacturer could preclude a dealer from selling
at less than a fixed price outside the dealer's territory because the impact on competition was
less than if the manufacturer had required an airtight territorial restriction.
177. See Bork, The Antitrust Paradox at 264 (cited in note 61).
178. Id.
179. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1984);
Posner, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 21 (cited in note 176). Such market discipline should only be
lacking when the manufacturer is a monopolist. In such a case there is no interbrand
competition to restrain a manufacturer from implementing vertical restrictions that cause
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dealers in imposing resale price restraints, it can be relied upon to
pursue its own self-interest in minimizing the adverse competitive
effect of the restraints. A manufacturer would not proceed on its own
with a restraint whose only effect was to reduce intrabrand competiti-
on and increase retail prices. When a manufacturer independently
decides to adopt resale price restrictions, and thus to reduce intra-
brand competition, it can safely be assumed that it expects, in return,
some offsetting benefit to consumers in the form of increased services.
Following the GTE Sylvania case, many antitrust commenta-
tors pointed out that there was no valid economic rationale for apply-
ing the per se rule to resale price restraints and the rule of reason to
non-price restraints. 180 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself conceded in
Monsanto and Sharp that the economic effects of price and non-price
restraints are similar.181 Nevertheless, since GTE Sylvania the Court
has not been able to bring itself to overrule its long-standing prece-
dent against resale price maintenance. The Court, in fact, reaffirmed
the per se illegality of such conduct in three different decisions in the
1980s. 2 The Court's awareness of the economic similarity of price
and non-price restraints, however, has created an ambivalence in its
recent decisions on vertical restraints. Instead of confronting the
issue directly, the Court has attempted to limit the practical reach of
the per se rule by redefining the offense of resale price maintenance.
The Court's approach has been based more on semantics than on eco-
nomic substance. In Monsanto, for example, the Court concentrated
on the formal elements for proof of a resale price fixing conspiracy.
higher resale prices than those desired by consumers. There is some precedent for finding
vertical restrictions illegal when they are imposed by manufacturers with market shares in
excess of 70%. See Graphic Products, 717 F.2d at 1570 (citing, among other things, the
defendant's 70% to 75% market share as evidence that the defendant enjoyed significant market
power). Some commentators have argued, however, that even monopolists want to produce a
product mix attractive to consumers and thus would be no less interested than nonmonopolists
in ensuring the efficiency of vertical restrictions. See Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels"
under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 26 n.78 (1982); Panel Discussion, Counseling Your
Client on Horizontal and Vertical Restraints, 55 Antitrust L. J. 293, 307 (1986) (comments of
Donald F. Turner).
180. See Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical
Restrictions, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1978) (arguing that "Sylvania went too far in swinging from
an overly rigid and sweeping per se doctrine all the way to a flexible rule of reason for all non-
price vertical restraints"); Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approa."
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1977) (proposing a test for the
legality of distribution restrictions to be applied to both price and non-price restraints).
181. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762; Sharp, 485 U.S. at 724.
182. See California Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 (1980);
324 Liquor Corporation v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341 (1987); Sharp, 485 U.S. at 723.
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The Court concluded that, in order to invoke the per se rule, a termi-
nated price cutter would have to prove that the manufacturer and
rival distributors had a "conscious commitment to a common scheme"'
to effect the termination. 183 In Sharp the Court created an artificial
distinction based on the number of distributors that induce a manu-
facturer to terminate a price-cutting rival. The Court held that the
rule of reason would be appropriate when only one distributor induces
the termination, but that the per se rule should apply when the in-
ducement comes from a group of distributors.84
The Court's approach to resale price fixing in these cases vio-
lated its own admonition in GTE Sylvania that antitrust analysis
"must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than...
upon formalistic line drawing.' ' 85 The distinctions created by the
Court have little to do with the actual economic effects of defendants'
conduct. The critical issue in such cases should not be whether the
manufacturer and rival distributors had a "conscious commitment to
a common scheme," as required by Monsanto, 86 for both the manufac-
turer implementing a termination and the distributor requesting it
obviously desired that the termination be consummated. Nor should
the number of distributors on the inducing level be determinative.
183. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)). After Monsanto, many federal courts dismissed claims by
terminated distributors on the grounds that they had failed to present sufficient evidence of a
conspiracy among the manufacturer and other distributors. See, for example, The Jeanery, 849
F.2d at 1157; Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 1986);
McCabe's Furniture, 798 F.2d at 330.
184. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 733-36. Lower federal court cases after Sharp have applied the per
se rule to terminations induced by more than one distributor. See Big Apple BMW v. BMW of
North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992) (characterizing a restraint as horizontal
rather than vertical because a number of dealers participated); ES Development, 939 F.2d at
556-57 (concluding that a letter writing campaign by dealers to a manufacturer was the result of
horizontal agreement and applying the per se rule); Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 769 F. Supp.
1506, 1513-19 (D. Minn. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 998 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
that a manufacturer's participation in a dealer's conspiracy to eliminate a competing dealer did
not change the horizontal nature of the restraint). See also Denny's Marina, 8 F.3d at 1220
(applying per se rule when boat dealers combined to exclude competing dealer from boat show).
However, adopting the artificial distinction in Sharp, the courts have denied a per se approach
when only one distributor has induced a termination. See Bailey's, 948 F.2d at 1031 (holding
that the defendant did not participate in a group boycott or conspire with firms at its own
competitive level); Ben Elfman Sons, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683, 686 (D.
Mass. 1991) (refusing to apply the per se rule where one distributor asked a manufacturer to
terminate another price-cutting distributor); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 728 F. Supp.
230, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to apply the per se rule to a vertical restraint absent a
showing of a price-fixing agreement).
185. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59.
186. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
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The termination of a price cutter induced by a single rival distributor
restricts intrabrand competition just as effectively as a termination
induced by several dealers. The most important issue is the manufac-
turer's purpose for the termination, that is, whether the manufacturer
implemented the termination to enhance the efficiency of its distribu-
tion system or merely to gratify the anticompetitive purposes of its
other distributors.
An ancillary restraints approach to vertical restraints makes
more economic sense than the current approach of the federal courts.
Under an ancillary restraints approach, the courts would focus, not on
artificial distinctions between price and non-price restraints, unilat-
eral and conspiratorial conduct, or single and multiple inducements,
but upon whether the restraint at issue was necessary to promote an
efficiency enhancing arrangement. Whether price or non-price, re-
strictions independently imposed by a manufacturer to enhance its
distribution system would be upheld. Regardless of the number of
firms on the inducing level, restrictions imposed as a result of the
inducement of a rival distributor would be prohibited. 187
Such an approach would reduce the time and expense of anti-
trust litigation and provide clearer guidance to manufacturers con-
templating various restrictions on intrabrand competition. In con-
trast to the vague rule of reason standard, executives could easily
understand an ancillary restraints approach because it is based upon
their own purpose for a vertical restraint. The antitrust bar could
counsel its clients to proceed with price or non-price restraints in-
tended to enhance the efficiency of their distribution systems and to
avoid acceding to distributors' demands to impose restraints on a
rival. Such a clear standard would encourage manufacturers to pro-
ceed with beneficial restraints while deterring them from restraints
that unjustifiably deprive consumers of alternative outlets for a
manufacturer's products.
187. The federal courts should be free to adopt such an ancillary restraints analysis even
after Monsanto and Sharp. The Court only held in Sharp that the rule of reason rather than
the per se rule should apply when a single distributor induces a manufacturer to terminate a
price-cutting rival. Sharp did not hold that the plaintiff cannot prevail in a single inducement
case. Neither did it preclude adoption of a new rule of reason approach which considers
whether a distributor termination was naked or ancillary to a manufacturer's attempt to en-
hance the efficiency of its distribution system. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Reformed
Antitrust Approach to Distributor Terminations, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 325 (1992)
(proposing a rule of reason test for distributor terminations that does not "turn on formalistic
distinctions between 'single' and 'multiple' inducements'.
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VII. CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, the analysis of conduct under Section I of
the Sherman Act has been driven by the assumption that all re-
straints of trade should be judged either by a harsh per se standard or
permissive rule of reason approach. During the last two decades, the
courts have begun to abandon the arbitrary categories of the per se
rule in favor of a more substantive analysis of the economic effects of
particular restraints of trade. Unfortunately, most courts have per-
ceived a traditional rule of reason analysis as the only alternative to
the per se rule. Despite efforts for reform by judges, academics, and
the enforcement agencies, the modern rule of reason remains vague
and undefined. As a result, the line between permissible and illegal
competitive behavior has become blurred. Judges and juries have
found it more difficult to render consistent decisions, businesses have
been deterred from entering into efficiency-enhancing arrangements,
and antitrust compliance in general has declined.
The per se and rule of reason standards have lost much of their
meaning, but the courts can adopt a new standard that preserves
their best traditions and avoids their most serious problems. The new
standard need be neither arbitrary nor vague. It can provide clear
guidance to American businesses and still ensure consideration of the
economic impact of the conduct at issue. The basis for the new ap-
proach would be the simple recognition that the courts can limit their
analysis to the minimum factors necessary to confirm the competitive
effects of particular restraints. In most cases the courts will have
enough experience to presume the likely efficiencies and anticompeti-
tive effects of the conduct at issue, and they will be able to avoid the
complications of a market power analysis entirely. At the same time,
litigants could be given the opportunity to rebut the applicable pre-
sumption in a manner that would preserve an economics-based anti-
trust policy. Such an approach would provide American companies
with a clear understanding of the types of competitive conduct which
they could safely pursue and those which they should avoid.
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